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Abstract 
i 
 
The express industry witnessed dramatic growth during the 1990’s with an 
economic environment changing toward globalisation. Integrators’ international 
expansion has been supported by extensive transportation networks applying 
the model developed by FedEx: the hub and spoke model. 
This report investigates integrators’ air network configurations within a specific 
geographical area: the intra-European market. The research has been focused 
on the big four integrators, DHL, FedEx, TNT and UPS and provides an 
analysis on their strategy. Before presenting integrators, a review of the 
different network models presents the major role played by the Hub and Spoke 
network in the express freight industry. This model is one of the strategic 
foundations of the integrators’ success.  
Afterwards, the paper deals with three objectives. It first identifies the hub and 
spoke network configurations selected by integrators in Europe. Then, work 
uncovers the drivers behind network configuration. Finally, the key factors 
influencing the European Hub location are discussed through the case of the 
DHL move to Leipzig. This paper provides a location analysis and compares 
Brussels to Leipzig in term of distance to the core market.  
 
This paper brings several conclusions. First of all, there is a strategic area to 
locate a central hub in Europe, between Amsterdam Liege & Paris. Moreover 
several factors influence central hub selection as followed: market proximity, 
Airport capacity1, environmental restrictions2, operational cost and capacity of 
driving traffic are the key factors. Secondly, two hub and spoke configurations 
are used by integrators in Europe, the single hub and spoke network with 
pickup stopovers and feeders and the multi-hub and spoke configuration. 
Finally, network configuration relies particularly on the size of business and the 
transport strategy elected.  
                                            
 
1
 This term includes slots restrictions, runway capacity, and possibility of building logistic 
facilities. 
2
 Includes night curfews and environmental concerns of the local community 
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1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Born in the late 1970’s just before the deregulation of the domestic US market, 
the express industry met a rapid success and a dramatic growth during the 
1990’s with an economic environment changing toward the globalisation and 
the development of logistic practices. This terrific growth has driven the success 
of integrated carriers.  
 
“International express has grown at more than twice the rate of total worldwide 
air cargo traffic, averaging 12.9% 3annually over the past decade” (Boeing, 
2006). 
 
Integrators international expansion has been supported by extensive 
transportation networks applying the model developed by FedEx: the hub and 
spoke model. However, several factors have influenced the evolution of 
integrators strategy, such as the development of freight time-definite market, 
economic boom in Asia or India, merger and increase in competition level, fuel 
price instability and so on. These factors have influenced integrators in their 
transportation and network strategy.  
 
Consequently, the purpose of this thesis is to state the current configurations of 
the Hub and Spoke model and determine the key factors behind it.  
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1.2 Rationale behind this study 
Integrators’ network configuration have been specifically analysed in the past 
using data modelling tools to solve issues related to hub location, or network 
performance. However, not many papers provide an analysis based on the four 
largest integrators’ strategies regarding at hub location and network 
configurations. Furthermore, following discussion with professionals and 
academic specialists, the possible outcomes of this research could be valuable 
to better understand the cargo sector of the air transport industry. 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
This paper provides an analysis of the main integrators’ networks in a specific 
geographical area.  The aim of this thesis is to compare the integrators’ air 
network within the European CEP 4market and to determine the strategy and 
the factors explaining the current structure. In order to achieve these aims three 
objectives have been defined to pursue this research. These objectives are to: 
 Determine the key factors influencing Integrators in European Hub 
selection through the case of DHL central hub moves. 
 Identify hub and spoke network configurations selected by integrators 
 Identify strategies behind such configurations 
1.4 Chapter Structure 
The thesis structure follows a classical format. Chapter 2, 3 and 4 provide the 
necessary background information to analyse the topic and the particular issues 
examined.  Chapter 2 summarises the historical and contemporary literature 
relating to network analysis and presents the basic concepts.  Chapter 3 gives 
an overview of the intra-European express market and defines the key 
elements, the market, the demand and the operators. Chapter 4 brings the 
reader further in the topic with a detailed description of the integrated carriers 
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considered within this study and their particular strategies. Following this 
background section, chapter 5 states the research approach and methodology. 
Finally chapters 6 and 7 respectively provide the results and the conclusion of 
this analysis. Chapter 6 provides a clear description and analysis of the air 
networks operated by integrators in the intra-European market before 
concluding and providing recommendation for further research on the topic.  
1.5 Limitations 
The airline industry is remarkable in its dynamic nature and the air express 
sector is no exception in encompassing a very wide range of complicated 
issues. The analytical part of this thesis has been limited due to reasons such 
as inaccessibility to commercially confidential data. Consequently assumptions 
have been drawn from qualitative data obtained.  
 
Furthermore, the scope of the paper is geographically limited to the intra-
European networks in order to provide a more specific analysis. The regional 
scale is the lowest possible when looking at integrators’ networks due to an 
intensive use of hub and spoke network and long distance flights. The intra-
European case has been selected for different reasons. First of all, an 
information collection concern was very sensitive. The data collection process 
was based on a European network of contacts. Secondly, the European area is 
the home market for two of the four main integrators and benefits from intensive 
competition. Thirdly, several specificities of the European market may influence 
network strategy such as regulation and economic concentration. 
Chapter 2 – Air Networks 
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2 Air Networks 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
Airline networks have been broadly reviewed in the past. Several books and 
papers are dedicated to issues related to this topic. For the purpose of this 
study, the relevant period considered research done from the mid 80’s up to 
contemporary ones. The recent papers, such as “International Air Network 
structures and air traffic density of world cities” by Matsumoto (2007), or “Airline 
Network Development in Europe and its implication for Airport planning” by 
Burghout (2006) show a continuous interest for issues around the topic. The 
majority of researches done in this topic area are passenger-related, due to a 
probable greater interest for this part of aviation. However within this paper, 
freight based studies are deeply considered and differ from passenger ones. 
The Hub and spoke model occupies a significant place in air network studies 
and so benefits from deep theoretical analysis.  The spatial approach has been 
the most popular way to analyse hub and spoke networks (Burghout G, 2006). 
However, another approach, temporal, has been more recently examined, 
particularly in the passenger business. For the purpose of this study, it is 
relevant to analyse this temporal approach since in the real world, express 
courier and package companies have used several methods applied in the 
passenger industry.   
The objective of this chapter is to define the key concepts of air network theory, 
to present the different theoretical approaches and the different network 
configurations. This chapter is divided into three parts. Firstly, a series of 
relevant key concepts and definitions are presented, before a brief presentation 
of the key network configurations. Finally, a deeper description of Hub and 
Spoke models, with strategic issues, is introduced to the reader. 
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2.2 Definition of Network in air transport industry 
The term “network” is a broad term used in many situations and represents 
different concepts. For the purpose of this study a few aviation-oriented 
definitions have been taken into consideration.  
A network can be defined as “a collection of nodes connected by facilities 
through which entities pass” (Button and Stough, 2000). It can be either 
physical or non physical. Airline networks are a mix between physical (airports) 
and non physical (air routes) components. Burghout (2006) insists on the 
connectivity of a network. 
 
“A network is defined as a set of interconnected nodes”. 
 
However, he notes that the “connectedness” is not simply spatial but also 
temporal (Burghout, 2006). Button (2002) preferred using the terms connectivity 
and interconnectivity. Connectivity is seen as the connection between two 
points and interconnectivity involves at least three nodes, as presented in the 
figure below. 
Figure 1: Difference between connectivity and interconnectivity 5 
 
 
 In most case, choices in network configuration are likely to be a function of 
factors such as external institutional factors6, availability of airport capacity or 
entry regulation, but also of economic considerations (Button, 2002). Indeed, a 
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6
 i.e. controls on flights routing 
i j 
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network has to perform more than the simple objective of providing single link 
services between two points. The economic reliability of a network is in many 
cases the only reason for its sustainability. This economic aspect can be 
assessed on the cost side but it may also reflect the possibility of earning higher 
revenues on the demand side (Button and Stough, 2000). The development of a 
new network model has been driven by economic interests for several reasons 
such as economies of scale or higher revenues associated with a particular 
network configuration. Another driver of the network configuration is the 
customer.  
Finally, in the aviation industry, route networks have not always been of prime 
concern in airline strategy, due to several factors. At the origin of aviation, 
airline network development relied to a large extent on technological 
development in aircraft performance. Indeed, early services consisted of multi-
stop, point-to-point flights using capacity aircraft over short distance due to 
limited performance (Berdy P, 2002). Moreover, up to 1978 in the domestic US 
market and 1997 in the intra-European market, airline networks were 
considerably regulated by authorities. However, this is still the case for a 
significant number of international connections. 
 
The different elements in a network 
 
Burghout (2006) distinguishes three basic types of nodes forming part of a 
network in aviation industry: the station, the traffic node and the hub. The 
function of these nodes varies based on spatial and temporal dimensions as 
presented in the table below (Burghout, 2006). 
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Table 1: Taxonomy of nodes in an airline network 7 
Decentral Central
No wave system 
Structure in airline     
flight schedule
Airline Station Feeder 
destination/spoke/rim airport/non-hub Traffic node  Continuous hub
Wave system structure 
in airline flight schedules Intermediate node
Hub, Traffic hub, Hinterland hub, 
Directional/hourglass hubs, Allround hub, 
Eurohub, Specialised hub, Global hub, 
hyper-hub, Mega_hub, Super-hub
Temporal configuration of the 
node
Spatial Configuration of the node
 
 
The airline station 
The Airline station is the most basic function of a node in the air (see table 1 
above). It can be visualised as a simple origin or destination point, from which 
“only air flows can originate or into which only flows destined for it can enter” 
(Burghout, 2006), without any temporal or spatial junctions. It is used as feeder 
origin-destination or as a spoke in a hub and spoke network configuration. 
However, despite a small number of direct connections in a single airline 
network, the spoke benefits from a “large onward connectivity through the hub” 
(Burghout, 2006).  
 
The traffic node 
The traffic node is considered as a central node, a key role in airline networks 
(see table above). It benefits from a large origin–destination market which 
involves frequent operations and so, can be used to transfer passenger flows 
and become a transfer node8 . Moreover, it tends to benefit from a central 
position spatially, and consequently can generate indirect connections. One of 
the derivatives of the traffic is the continuous hub. An example of this type of 
node is London Heathrow (Burghout, 2006).  
 
 
 
                                            
 
7
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 20-30% of the total number passengers according to Burghout (2006) 
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The Hub  
Ivy (1993) defines a hub as “a central collection point or node in a transportation 
system or network”. As shown in table 1 above, a hub performs, both spatially 
and temporally, a central position in the network. Berdy (2002) offers another 
view of the role of the hub. He sees hubs as a way to minimize the risk that an 
aircraft/aeroplane will depart with too many empty seats. However, he presents 
a limitation of hub utilisation. A hub needs enough “critical mass” to add new 
flights for connecting or flow traffic as well as flights to serve local markets.  
Usage of the term, however, has become particularly applied for the air 
transportation industry in the USA, since the deregulation and the development 
of the Hub and Spoke system (Ivy R.L., 1993).  
2.3 Model Presentation 
Burghout (2006) tried to elaborate a classification of the different network 
structures depending on the spatial and temporal concentration as presented in 
table 2 below.  
Table 2: The airline network configuration matrix 9 
Co-ordinated Random
Concentrated Hub and Spoke Random radial
Deconcentrated Co-ordinated / deconcentrated Point-to-Point
Level of temporal concentration at the hubLevel of spatial concentration 
 
Identifying clearly the network configuration used by companies has revealed to 
be a difficult task because networks are very dynamic with links being 
continually added and removed (Button, 2002). Despite recognising airline 
networks as “a mixture between different forms”, Burghout (2006) made a 
geometrical classification (see figure 2 below). Indeed, according to him, within 
most of the hub and spoke networks, some spoke cities have direct services 
between them, and even in mainly point-to-point type networks some traffic is 
consolidated over transfer points. 
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Figure 2: Time-space continuum of airline network configurations 10 
  
 
Figure 2 above aggregates most of the network configurations established in air 
transportation. The graph classifies the different models depending on the 
temporal and spatial concentration level. The two main models are the fully 
connected point-to-point at the bottom left hand corner of the graph and the 
single hub and spoke models at the top right hand corner. These two types of 
network are opposites. As presented in the graph, there are several hub and 
spoke configurations such as single hub, dual hub and wheel-and-spoke but the 
first two are the most used for integrators’ networks. A more detailed description 
is presented to the reader in the following section.  
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2.4 The Hub-and-spoke model 
A concept used in different businesses such as telecommunication, Information 
Technology, or transportation, the hub-and-spoke model was introduced in 
aviation in 1973 by the founder of FedEx, Fred Smith. The concept, pioneered 
by FedEx using Memphis (Chan, 1994),  has met with terrific success since the 
Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, forcing the American air industry into a 
competitive market situation (Ivy, 1993). One of the consequences was the 
change in airline network geography driven by higher priority for flow efficiency 
and cost reduction. “Airlines were trying to concentrate flights on one or more 
key regional nodes in their networks to raise load factor and aircraft utilisation.” 
(Ivy, 1993) 
With the expanding use of this model, during the 1980’s, hub network issues 
started to become the subject of scientific studies. As the hub and spoke 
network strategy has been applied in the passenger and freight transport 
business, scientists have been concerned by both applications. Despite a 
significant evolution of the model, most of the research has been focused on the 
“pure” hub and spoke network. Kuby and Gray (1993) analysed the case of the 
pioneer of the Hub and spoke system and realised that economic reality is not 
so close to the pure model11.  
2.4.1 Definition 
Burghout (2006) published fourteen relevant definitions of the Hub and Spoke 
network. Some are passenger related, for Berry & al or Dennis who consider a 
hub and spoke network, for the first one, as a fact when passengers change 
planes at a Hub airport to another destination, and the second Dennis who uses 
the concept of origin, destination and connecting passengers in the purpose of 
flying internationally. 
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Separately, Button (2002) and Kanafani & Ghobrial (1985) provide airport 
related views. Indeed, the first author states that the model is used by an airline 
of one or more large airports, with flights operated in banks to consolidate 
outbound flights. The second one characterises the concept as a collection – 
distribution centre for passengers. 
Two authors, O’Kelly (1986) and Shaw (1992) have an interesting approach to 
define the model. O’Kelly defines hubs as specials nodes with a particular 
location to facilitate connection. Shaw uses both the geographical and 
collection/distribution concepts with functions to connect a set of nodes. 
In order to summarize, the hub and spoke model has been described as a flow 
concentration into a central node, the hub, to which are connected numerous 
spokes. Spokes have been explained by Berdy (2002), as cities served on 
inbound or outbound flights to/from a hub. Moreover, Berdy (2002) considers 
that the basic role of a hub is to cross connect flights. It means connecting at 
least two aircraft arrivals and departures. 
 Difference between passenger and freight oriented hub and spoke 
model 
Despite a common use of the model, applications and theory show some 
distinction between the freight and passenger view Hub and Spoke networks.    
First of all, operating conditions are substantially different regarding operability 
constraints. According to Kuby and Gray (2003), on the passenger side, the 
customer is unwilling to make large detours on their journey which tends to 
influence passenger-airlines using multi hub systems. However, in the cargo or 
courier market, detours are not a problem as long as the package arrives on 
time; the customer does not care how it is routed.  
Consequently, air cargo operators can find it easier to focus on the single 
mega-hubs and pass through it large volumes of shipments during the night 
time. However, in express operations, despite the fact that the customer does 
not care about the routing, the time window does not allow large detours. 
Another difference between cargo and passenger network organisation is the 
impact of airport congestion. Kuby and Gray (1993) notices that it is impossible 
Chapter 2 – Air Networks 
 
12 
for an airline to monopolize facilities for a long enough period of the day (up to 2 
hours) to fully use the wave system of the hub. The obvious way to escape 
congestion is to operate from an airport serving a smaller city, which has the 
disadvantage of bring of low origin-destination traffic necessary for a base for 
passenger airlines. The difference is that low traffic is less penalizing for cargo, 
as flights takes place in the middle of the night. This is a main reason for the 
fact that express integrators have hubs in smaller centre, such as Wilmington 12 
or Subic Bay 13 where there are few other flights competing for night-time 
runway access (Kuby & Gray, 1993). 
 Advantages 
Several advantages explain the expansion of this model over the past thirty 
years. The first reason is the possibility of increasing the market coverage with 
the same fleet. Two models have been developed to prove this argument. For 
Berdy (2002), in a Hub and Spoke configuration, the number of markets served 
14by a hub grows exponentially as aircraft are added in the fleet.  Taking the 
example of a hub with 50 aircraft, Berdy assumes that the airline can 
theoretically serve 2,600 destinations as presented in the table below. The 
formula used is the following, where “N” is the number of aircraft used: 
 
( )NN +2  
                                            
 
12
 DHL hub in USA 
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Table 3: Size of the fleet and market served relation 15 
Local Connecting Total
1 2 1 3
2 4 4 8
3 6 9 15
4 8 16 24
5 10 25 35
6 12 36 48
7 14 49 63
8 16 64 80
9 18 81 99
10 20 100 120
20 40 400 440
30 60 900 960
40 80 1600 1680
50 100 2500 2600
Nb Aircraft Market served
 
 
Chan (1994) has used another calculation. According to him, the number of city 
pairs that an airline can serve for a given number of outputs increases 
significantly using a hub and spoke network compared to point to point. Indeed, 
if “ n ” points are to be served non-stop, ( ) 21−nn routes are necessary to satisfy 
all possible city-pairs. However, using a central node as a hub, the ( ) 21−nn  
city pairs can be reduced by “ n ”spokes. Taking the example of a network 
serving 5 cities as presented in the figure below, it is possible to understand the 
difference between both configurations. In the first example, in a pure point-to-
point network the airline needs to operate 10 routes16 instead of 5 routes using 
a hub and spoke configuration.  
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Figure 3: Difference between Point-to-Point and Hub and Spoke model 
 
 
Moreover, a hub and spoke configuration allows unit cost reduction and load 
factor increase using economies of scale. Consequently, the processes are 
more efficient and resources, particularly the specialist ones, benefit from better 
allocation (Chan, 1994). 
 Disadvantages 
Hub and spoke configurations provide a series of benefits compatible with 
express operations; however, this system is not perfect and brings a series of 
disadvantages. First of all, according to Chan (1994) the journey time increases 
more or less significantly, depending on the extra distance flown, due to back 
track. Secondly, as journey times rise, several costs in connection to it augment 
in consequence, such as crew cost, fuel cost, and other operating costs. Finally, 
a hub is often vulnerable to congestion and so can become unreliable (Chan, 
1994). Berdy (2002) determines some issues in relation to passenger business 
but that could be applicable to the express industry. A hub can reach saturation 
in some cases. Taking the example of the fifty aircraft case described above, 
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airlines need to flow traffic directionally to all of the 2,600 destinations in order 
to obtain maximum profit.  The problem is that there are only a few geographical 
locations where hubs can serve numerous cities in the same direction without 
increasing significantly the length of the passenger journey and without having 
to add massive capacity at hub airports (Berdy, 2002). 
2.4.2 Design of a hub and spoke network 
Chan (1994) identifies three characteristics for an effective hub. Firstly, the hub 
location must be central to the market served in order to reduce back-track.  
One of the advantages is the uniformity of flying time for each hub and spoke 
pair.  Secondly, the airport selected must provide sufficient facilities such as 
runway capacity, space for sorting facilities and cargo handling facilities during 
the required time slots. In the case of the express business, night slots must be 
available.  
Finally, the schedules have to be coordinated to waves of aircraft arrivals and 
departure in order to maximize the number of connections while minimizing the 
time spent on the ground as presented in figure 4 below.  
Figure 4: Wave system in hub and spoke configuration 17 
   
 
Before going further to the scheduling process, a series of technical terms need 
to be defined.  The term “wave” (or “bank”) is defined as a combination of arrival 
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and departing aircraft within a time window (Berdy, 2002). A “window” is the 
length of time that airline planners have created for the bank to actively transfer 
passengers (Berdy, 2002).  
 Classification of hub and spoke networks 
According to C.C, Y.J & D.Y Lin, there are three basic types of hub and spoke 
air networks that can be considered. However, this classification is theoretical 
and the boundaries between the models are blurred in reality. The case of multi-
hub networks is not considered by Lin but this structure occurs when an airline 
seeks to serve a large market. The hub is then located in order to maximize the 
market penetration, minimise the length of hub to spoke connections, and avoid 
high levels of congestion at the central hub (Button, 2002).  
• Pure hub and spoke networks 
Air centres and hubs are connected by air links. The pairs are operated 
between air centres and the hub but also between hubs. However, the direct 
pairs between air centres are not permitted as is shown in the figure below. As 
a result, all air cargo requires at least one re-handling at one at the hubs before 
going to its final destination (Lin, 2003). 
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Figure 5: Pure Hub and Spoke model 18 
 
Within this model, two organisation types exist according to CC, YJ & DY Lin. In 
a single assignment hub and spoke organisation, air centres can only be 
connected by a single hub instead of the multiple assignments in which all 
centres are freely connected to several or all hubs.  
C.C, Y.J and D.Y Lin present, in their paper, the main advantage for a pure 
single hub and spoke, explained in the past by Chester. “Re-handling at hubs is 
aimed at reducing the inefficiency associated with the direct flow of partial loads 
from pickup centres to delivery centres. A small increase in re-handling cost can 
significantly reduce the requirements for flight equipment, personnel and air 
miles, and other overall operating costs” (Lin, 2003). 
• Hub and spoke with pickup stopovers and feeders 
In the case of low quantity of freight to collect at some centres, C.C, Y.J and 
D.Y Lin (2003) explain that express carriers sometimes use smaller aircraft, air 
feeders, stopping at a series of small centres in order to pick up additional 
shipments and fill up the aircraft before arriving at an air transit centre. Then 
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freight from the feeders is reloaded onto larger aircraft destined to a hub for 
consolidation as we can see in figure 6 below. Similarly, large aircraft may stop 
at other air centres on trunk routes for additional pickups before reaching the 
hub. Even though all shipments require hub re-handling, the use of pick up 
stopover minimizes empty hold space in aircraft and eliminates underutilised 
direct air centre-to-hub capacity. 
Figure 6: Hub and spoke with pickup stopovers and feeders model19 
 
• Hub and spoke with centre-to-centre directs 
This consists of re-handling the shipments at intermediate centres. Therefore if 
desirable, the carrier can load and deliver freight from that centre, or transit 
freight may be unloaded from incoming aircraft and reloaded onto ongoing 
aircraft without further consolidation (Lin, 2003). An advantage of this system is 
that the carrier may feed some pickups directly from their points of collection to 
points of destination, avoiding unnecessary hub re-handling centre-to-centre 
direct cargo. Another advantage of the system is flexibility. It is possible for a 
carrier to respond dynamically to interim needs at stopover points allowing 
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carrying capacity to be used more efficiently (Lin, 2003). Indeed, for example, 
the express carriers have a possibility to postpone aircraft upgrade in case of an 
increase in traffic.  However, this solution can produce higher consolidation 
costs due to the fact that shipments have to be re-handled at each intermediary 
point. 
Finally, C.C, Y.J and D.Y Lin (2003) consider that the hub and spoke network 
with centre-to-centre directs is especially suitable for high density centres with 
low pickups within a relatively small geographical area. 
• Hub selection 
Since cargo is not sensitive to routing and scheduling in the same way that 
passengers are, the criterion for freight hub selection differs from that of 
passenger hubs. Much cargo is moved at night and can use passenger hub 
capacity, free at that time, e.g. DHL at Cincinnati, (Button and Stough, 2000). 
Equally, similarly to FedEx, a cargo hub may be located at a city generating 
relatively low passenger traffic, which can represent a benefit due to less 
congestion. The integrated carriers’ networks differ from passenger carriers in 
that they have a single large hub rather than multi hub interactive networks 
(Button and Stough, 2000). In the case of the European and Asian markets, the 
problem of Hub location is sensitive due to the competition between cities to 
become key hubs for international air transportation, according to Matsumoto 
(2007). 
 
Chan (1994) has determined a series of factors in the assessment process for 
potential hub selection. Distance of transportation, travel time, operating cost, 
quality of cargo handling service, route authorisation and finally no flights curfew 
are the considered factors. Moreover, Chan (1994) has defined a series of rules 
for hub selection. Firstly, the hub location should be geographically central in 
relation to the market served in order to reduce “back-track” and to obtain a 
more uniform flying time between hub and spokes. Secondly, the airport should 
provide good facilities, offering an ample runway capacity and space for sorting 
facilities and equipments, during the required time slots. Thirdly, next-day 
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deliveries demand night operations and need slots available in the late evening 
(feeder flights from spokes to the hub) and early morning (delivery flights from 
the hub to the spokes). Fourthly, a hub requires space, eg the case of DHL in 
Leipzig. Finally, it needs good airport organisation in order to support a wave’s 
coordination system between aircraft arrivals and departures (Chan, 1994). 
 
Doganis and associates (1999) have defined a series of rules, to take into 
account when selecting a hub airport, more detailed and concerned by the 
European situation. Firstly, the proximity of the airport to business centres and 
industrial activities is sensitive. Secondly, in order to ensure delivery service to 
delivery depots with less costly road transportation, the hub needs to be located 
within an area 5 hours away by road transport to as many major cities as 
possible. Thirdly, the airport needs to provide sufficient runway length, both for 
flights to the further destinations of Europe and for non stop flights by large 
freighter aircraft to other intercontinental hubs in North America and Asia. 
Fifthly, 24-hour operation is vital and the airport should be able to handle large 
numbers of aircraft arriving and departing in a short operational window 
between 2400 and 0100; departure between 0200 and 0300. Finally, the airport 
should be able to provide (Doganis and associates, 1999):  
• A large apron area 
• Space for construction of a major sorting centre 
• An adequate supply of labour in its locality  
• Customs facilities 
• Fuelling facilities 
• A low rate of diversions due to poor weather  
• Ready access to the principal highways of Europe 
 
Gardiner’s (2006) key findings have been considered to complete the list of 
factors influencing airport selection. He reports several factors not indicated 
above such as strong origin-destination market required, bad weather record 
acts, good road access to the airport and the speed of customs throughput at 
an airport. 
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• Hub classification 
The initial usage of the word “hub” in the air transportation industry was 
designated by the Civil Aeronautics Board and continued by the FAA. This 
definition does not consider the airport as a transfer but used the term to 
categorize each hub based on its share of the total number of revenue 
passengers boarded in the country (Ivy, 1993). The term “Large Hubs” 
represented airports with at least 1% of total passengers. “Medium hubs” 
include airports processing between 0.25% and 0.99% of total passengers and 
“small hubs” enplaning less than 0.05% of the nation’s passengers (Ivy, 1993). 
Later, another way to classify the airport as a hub has been developed by 
several specialists such as Burghout (2006). According to Burghout, in network 
analysis, hub classification depends on three characteristics: the size of the 
origin-destination market; the stage length of indirect connection offered and the 
geographical specialisation of the hub traffic. The different models determined 
by Burghout (2006) are shown in the figure below. 
• Size of origin-destination market 
This can be defined as the measure of passenger traffic such as travel origin or 
destination. These characteristics help to distinguish two different types of hub. 
First of all, the “traffic hub” is an airline hub using its potential as an origin-
destination node for local traffic (Burghout, 2006). On the contrary, a way-port 
depends heavily on transfer traffic (over 60%). Way-port airports can be suitable 
for their geographical location and rely on the wave system to ensure maximal 
and seamless indirect connectivity (Burghout, 2006). 
•  Stage length of the segment of indirect connection 
This characteristic allows the definition of four airport types (Burghout, 2006). 
First, the hinterland hub links international routes with short haul routes such as 
in the European Union, domestic European with intercontinental routes mix. 
Secondly, the directional (or hourglass) hub connects geographically separated 
regions located in opposite directions. This type tends to have unidirectional 
traffic i.e. east-west, south-north traffic and requires an excellent geographical 
position. The regional hub offers mainly short to short haul connections and 
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finally the all rounds hubs comprise all three kinds of connection (regional, 
directional and hinterland). 
• Geographic specialisation 
This part determines three kinds of hub according to the geographic 
specialisation of the traffic. In the case of a region, the hub can be specialised in 
intra regional traffic such as Eurohub for intra European traffic. A hub can also 
be specialised in a certain geographic area such as Madrid as in the Europe-
Latin America hub. Finally the global hub covers the whole range of continental 
and intercontinental destinations. 
Figure 7: Taxonomy of the different types of hub20 
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2.5 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has confirmed the importance of networks in the airline industry 
and has noted that the basic role of a network is to connect nodes and to be 
economically reliable. The three components of a network (airline station, traffic 
node and hub) have been defined and the differences between passenger and 
freight air network operation have been stated.  
 
Moreover, this chapter has presented the two-dimensional 21 approach of 
network analysis by Burghout and the different factors involved in the hub 
selection process have been reported.  
 
Finally, the difficulties in classifying network configurations have been noted 
such as the weight in research papers of point to point and single hub and 
spoke network configurations. The hub and spoke network has been presented 
with its advantages and disadvantages but also its different models. In order to 
complete this chapter a classification of the different functions of a hub has 
been given to the reader.  
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3 The Air Freight Market  
3.1 Chapter overview 
Accounting for 1% of world air tonnage and 40% of trade value in 2006 (FedEx 
annual report 2006), the worldwide air freight market is broad and encompasses 
a wide range of shipments and products, from light documents to heavy general 
and specialist cargo that can be categorised by weight. Air express is only a 
component of the global air freight market (Doganis & associates, 1999).   
 
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the intra-European freight 
market, considering particularly the CEP market. In order to carry out this 
description, the chapter is divided into 3 parts: the market, the demand and the 
players. 
 
At the end of this chapter a series of conclusions are provided to the reader in 
order to underline the main points.  
3.2 Air Freight Market Definition 
Air freight is defined as the transportation of freight, mail and excess baggage22, 
according to the CAA (Keynotes report, 2005).  It is relevant to consider the 
freight market as a multi-market involving multimodal transport “chain” in a 
multi-market air cargo network (Zhang et al., 2007). 
According to the Major Ekman (2002), two characteristics of the freight market 
are relevant for network consideration. Firstly, it is expensive: “The reason for 
cargo to be shipped by air is very seldom related to transportation cost, as air 
freight, as a rule, is some ten times more expensive than shipping by lorry of 
ship” (Ekman, 2002). In order to justify the choice for air freight transportation, 
the shipper needs to find other factors to outweigh the disadvantage of cost, 
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such as speed, reliability and security (Ekman, 2002). Secondly, it is easier than 
passenger air transport. “While passengers prefer to fly the shortest route 
between two points and not to transfer between aircraft, air cargo does not have 
any such preferences. Cargo does not mind night flight…” (Ekman, 2002). 
Moreover, air freight is divided into two markets, the general freight market, 
mainly time-indefinite, and the express time definite freight market. 
 The general freight market 
The general freight market includes all shipments using air transport but without 
a time definite transportation chain. These shipments are mainly carried by the 
traditional chain using airlines 23 , freight forwarders and more recently 
integrators. 
 The express freight market 
The Oxford Economics Group (2002) defines the express freight market. “The 
express industry core business is the provision of value added, door to door 
transport and deliveries of next day or time definite shipments” (Oxford 
Economic, 2002). The shipments covered by express transportation are mail, 
parcels and other items with a high value-to-weight ratio or a time-sensitive 
delivery requirement, such as spare parts (Keynote November 2005). Deliveries 
are mostly executed through an integrated network of transport facilities, 
integrating pick up, customs clearance, air transportation, delivery and so on 
(Doganis & Associates, 1999).Oxford Economics (2002) states that “To meet 
the requirements of business, the express industry relies on overnight transport, 
fully utilising the time from when a company hands over its shipment late in the 
working day to allow delivery early the next day”.  Before going further in the 
market description, it is imperative to present the products forming part the CEP 
market. First of all, two product families are included in express transportation: 
 Mail 
 Parcel  
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Parcel comprises items that may be handled by one person without any special 
requirements. The characteristics of express shipments are time definite, high 
value commodities, high added value and low density (Oxford Economic, 2002). 
The express industry, born in the United States and developed since 
deregulation of air cargo services during the late 1970s, met a rapid expansion 
since this period (Oxford Economic, 2002).  According to Boeing (Boeing 
forecast 2006) the market “has grown at more than twice the rate of total 
worldwide air cargo traffic”, with an average approaching 13% annually over the 
past decade as measured in revenue tonne-kilometres24. The following figure 
illustrates this growth. 
Figure 8: Evolution of express share within international freight market                          
(1991 and 2005)25 
 
 
However, since 2000, annual growth has been slower at 6.9% as shown in the 
figure above (Boeing, 2006). As a proportion of total international air cargo 
traffic, international express expanded from 4.1% in 1992 to nearly 11.4% in 
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2005, reflecting higher-than-average annual growth as shown in the figure 
above. 
Kuby and Gray (2003) determine three factors influencing the boom of express 
package companies in the past. The fact that the developed countries have 
been more and more interdependent; innovation, i.e. computer and 
communications have particularly brought new solutions; and the application on 
the Air Cargo Deregulation Act of 1978 have highly influenced the development 
of express integrators.  
 
The express industry is composed of many operators, from local based 
companies to international groups. The four main worldwide participants are 
DHL, FedEx, TNT and UPS, known as integrators.  
3.2.2 The European CEP Market 
Three main characteristics can be identified in the European CEP market. The 
first particularity of the European market is the economic concentration on the 
northern part of the continent. “[…] leading markets are concentrated in the 
north European countries of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland […]” (Boeing, 2006). This statement is 
confirmed by the traffic data from Eurostat (2008), presented by figure 9. 
Indeed, 20% of European countries stand for 81.42% of the Freight carried in 
Europe. Consequently, air cargo in this area is characterised by short length, 
(most of the sector lengths are between 900 km and 1200 km) according to 
Boeing (2006).  
 
Chapter 3 – Air Freight Market Presentation 
 
28 
Figure 9: European air freight and mail transport by state, 200626 
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Another attribute of this market is the Schenghen agreement signed in 1985, 
allowing the abolition of systematic border controls between the member 
countries. This decision, coupled with the relative small size of the national 
territories led to an intensive international dimension in the European Market.   
As described in figure 10, International traffic counts for 97.4% of the market. 
Within this segment, 24% is the share of the intra-European traffic. 
Figure 10: European Freight and Mail Traffic split in 200627 
Domestic International International Intra-EU International External Coutries with EU
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Finally, the third characteristic is the position of the Express segment of the 
market. As shown in figure 11 below, the express traffic influenced the rapid 
expansion between 1990 and 2000 of the intra-Europe air cargo market has 
met, with an average growth rate of 6% a year (Boeing, 2006). 
Figure 11: The Intra-Europe Air Cargo Market between 1985 and 200528                                                          
 
 
This significant development is a consequence of a dual impact for Boeing. The 
first reason is the development of Express product offers, mainly through the 
development of Integrators’ networks. The second one was presented above. 
The Shenghen agreement removed customs inspection on goods moving 
between several countries in northern Europe and resulted in road 
transportation expansion. Many air cargo flights are carried by lorries. However 
since 2000 the market growth slowed down to an average annual growth rate of 
less than 1% from 2000 and 2005.  
3.3 Demand 
Used at the beginning for emergency transportation, the air cargo market has 
changed over time.  Demand for air cargo looks for a rapid and secure means 
to transport shipments over long distances. Shipment value can justify the 
needs of such transportation. A shipment can be expensive or simply sensitive 
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for the shipper or consignee and air transport is secure compared to other 
means of transportation. However, the most obvious role for air transport 
remains the carriage of emergency freight, such as medical components and 
spare parts for machinery as shown in figure 12 below. 
Figure 12: Air cargo goods29 
 
 
Three factors have considerably changed the air freight market since the mid-
1980s: globalisation, supply chain management and information technology 
evolution. Globalisation has developed new geographical markets and 
increased the distance between consumer and producer. The phenomenon, 
coupled with the development of logistics practices and particularly supply chain 
management has developed a real need for regular effective and secure 
intercontinental transportation. The “Just In Time” model requires even more 
rapid and effective transportation chains due to a severe reduction of stocks. 
Finally, information technology development and particularly the internet have 
changed the market. Primarily, a threat for courier business due to the 
development of electronic mailing, it has been a real opportunity to develop 
private business. Indeed, the internet has driven the development of e-
commerce, requiring worldwide parcel transportation for households. Moreover 
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with the development of the express business, the yield has been pulled down, 
making this service more and more affordable.  
 
Since the beginning of the 1990’s, the express demand has met a rapid 
development in Europe and the number of daily shipments carried has grown at 
an average of 11.7% a year over the period 1993 – 2005 as presented in figure 
13 below.    
Figure 13: Estimated daily express shipments in thousands between 1993 and 200530 
 
3.4 The players 
Preceding the integrator’s model creation, only one transport chain was present 
in the air cargo market, called nowadays the “traditional air freight chain” (Zhang 
et al., 2007). This model is based on the relationship of freight forwarder – 
airline where airlines are in charge of the transportation “airport-to-airport” as 
shown in the graph below (Zhang et al., 2007). The rest of the transportation 
chain is handled by the freight forwarder which is also the sale agent. This chain 
shows an intensive relation between the agent and airlines. According to Cancy 
and Hoppin (Zhang et al., 2007), 80% of airline air cargo tonnage uses freight 
forwarders, particularly with recent changes toward third party operators.  
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According to Button and Stough (2000), three main categories of cargo 
operators can be considered: the lines operators, the niches carriers and the 
integrators. However, it is relevant to note the key roles of freight forwarders in 
the transportation chain. 
 
Figure 14: Air cargo transportation chain31 
 
3.4.1 The lines operators 
The lines haul operators manage the transport airport-to-airport and rely on 
Freight Forwarders for the rest. This category is composed of “All cargo 
carriers”, (scheduled and non scheduled) offering relative high reliability and 
capabilities to move large volumes over long distances (Button and Stough, 
2000). In the past, several line operators have tried to challenge integrators by 
offering integrated products such as British Airways (only airport to door), 
Cathay Pacific, Singapore Airlines, and Swissair mainly in collaboration with 
freight forwarders (Chan, 1994). 
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3.4.2 The niches carriers 
The term niche operator, according to Doganis (2002), defines a variety of 
scheduled and charter all-cargo carriers smaller than lines operators and 
operating within a particular region such as Emery Worldwide or Polar Air 
cargo. Niches carriers are mainly geographically specialised except some 
specialised in a particular product, eg super-size or super-heavy fret. 
3.4.3 The Integrators 
The carriage of express is generally done by integrators. At present the 
international air express market is dominated by four players, known as the “big 
four”. Indeed, integrated carriers are specialised in time definite carriage and 
express shipment of courier and parcels.  “The term integrator refers to the 
ability of these companies to offer door-to-door integrated services” (Oxford 
Economic, 2002). The benefit of this vertical integration is a smooth transition 
from one mode to another and an efficient service (Ekman, 2002).  
Moreover, integrated carriers offer a variety of products to shippers and 
supplement air services with extensive ground transport to provide time definite 
delivery with continuous shipment tracking and, if necessary logistical expertise 
to support “Just In Time” inventory control strategy (Button and Stough, 2000). 
Regarding the type of operation achieved (night flight), integrators operate quiet 
and reliable aircraft. Integrated carriers’ fleets have low utilisation levels (only 
light flights, in some cases only 2 hours per day). Integrated carriers, for 
economic reasons on the cost side and market presence on the demand size 
require large operations. For instance, DHL express, in 2006, employed 
124,280 people and operated 420 aircraft (DPWN, 2006). To summarize, Chan 
(1994) has determined the characteristics of the integrator business: 
 Service accessibility with smooth and simple processes. 
 Only one responsible and contact with intermediaries. 
 Premium rate guaranteed by highly valuable time definite integrated 
service. 
 Standardisation of the processes and packages. 
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 High degree of branding awareness. 
 Use of dedicated resources to ensure reliable service but involving high 
operating costs. 
Heavy investment in specialised equipment which induces economies of scale 
is a major target and a major supporting reason for the use of hub and spoke 
networks. 
Night operation (particularly for next day deliveries) means that quiet and 
reliable aircraft are required and induce a low utilisation of the resources. 
3.4.4 Freight forwarder 
“Traditionally, a freight forwarder is defined as `an agent who arranges transport 
and prepares shipping documentation” (Keynote, 2006). The Freight 
Forwarders represent the traditional air cargo chain when airlines and shippers 
relied on third party companies to organise pick up, delivery, warehousing, 
customs clearances, insurance and others services necessary for the shipment 
of goods. Freight forwarders were considered as the distribution chain of 
airlines. However those agents have to face the development of integrators’ 
products and the overall increase of capacity offered in the freight market. 
Freight Forwarders’ profitability has been reduced forcing major consolidation 
and mergers. In order to face direct competition from integrators, freight 
forwarders have pursue several strategies such as merger with airlines to 
create third party agent, partnership with airlines or integrators and even merger 
with integrators.   
3.4.5 Post Offices 
Post offices were national state owned companies in charge of postal and in 
some cases small parcel deliveries. Since the 1960s, national post offices have 
faced several challenges, such as privatisation, competition and decrease of 
market size. From the late century to the 1960s, national Posts were linked 
through the UPU, an international monopoly of international created by national 
post offices (TIACA, 2001). However, competition appeared, with first airlines 
and then integrators. Indeed, Federal Express and DHL Worldwide created at 
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this time a new time definite and more reliable document service, which 
appears to be a direct challenge to the postal monopolies. Since then Post 
offices have chosen different strategies to survive, particularly forced by the 
deregulation of domestic markets. “Post offices are being forced to become 
more international” (TIACA, 2001). “They are making defensive domestic 
acquisitions whilst expanding aggressively internationally” (TIACA, 2001), as 
shown in the figure below, presenting the different strategy chosen. Two 
dimensions have been taken into account, the degree of innovation to develop 
new products and the degree of international expansion.  
Figure 15: Post Office market Strategy 32 
 
 
On the right are those post offices that have taken the decision to expand 
internationally. For example, Deutsche Post has invested considerably in order 
to built a major worldwide logistics group. DHL represents the major acquisition 
of the group. TPG (Dutch Post) have mainly focused their development on the 
couriers and parcel market with the TNT purchase (TIACA, 2001).  On the 
innovation scale, Deutsche Post is also strongly present with the development 
of e-commerce services.  
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3.5 Alliances and merging  
The increase of the competition level within the freight market following the 
development of integrators has produced changes in the market with alliances 
and mergers between different players. Indeed, the market saw freight 
forwarders merging, freight forwarders merging with integrators 33 , freight 
forwarders and airline partnerships34, combination airlines entering the express 
door to door market thanks to a partnership with freight forwarders, shipping 
companies, integrators 35and airline alliances, eg WOW and Sky team Cargo.  
Integrator alliances and acquisition will be developed in the next chapter.  
3.6 Regulation 
The regulation of air transport had a tremendous impact in both passenger and 
cargo activities. Even nowadays regulation brings constraints to the integrators 
strategies. Passengers and cargo air transport have met similar regulatory 
regimes. The Chicago convention of 1944 and the bilateral agreements have 
largely influenced the development of air cargo. The link between passengers 
and cargo legislation is also visible during liberalisation. So, the liberalization of 
the passenger market also applied to air cargo activities. Moreover, belly hold 
capacities on commercial flights are largely used in the freight market. So, 
passenger traffic regulation still influences cargo activities, particularly knowing 
the use of this capacity by some integrators (Button & Stough, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, the courier market has some particularities. The first air cargo 
services were mainly for the carriage of mail. The transportation of courier was 
unprofitable and so direct subsidies were provided by governments to support 
them. A limited number of carriers could exploit these routes and so enjoyed 
monopolies. Monopolies in the courier market have been removed recently or 
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remain present and so it has been a constraint of express market development 
in the world (Button & Stough, 2000).  
 
Finally, environmental regulations, such as, noise emission control, fuel 
emission regulation or chapter 2 aircraft restrictions have an impact in cargo 
carriers’ strategies. Regarding noise restriction, it is interesting to note, that the 
aircraft noise restriction agreed by the European minister of transport relates to 
two areas. First of all, the non addition of chapter 2 aircraft to EU aircraft 
registers after 1992 has been applied and followed by the ban on chapter 2 
aircraft and engines after 1997 (Button & Stough, 2000).  
3.7 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has given to the reader an overview of the freight market, the 
characteristics of the European situation and express activities.  
 
This chapter explains that the air cargo market is composed of general freight 
and express freight. The express freight market includes courier and parcel 
transportation. The features of the European market have been presented, 
particularly the economic concentration on the North West area or the 
integrators presence, accounting for more than 51% of freight carried.  
 
Moreover, in Chapter three, the characteristics of demand in the air cargo 
market have been displayed. 
 
Finally, the different players and their role in the market have been detailed as 
well as alliances and regulation. 
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4 Integrators’ Strategy 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the past, current and 
future strategies adopted by the four integrators, particularly in the European 
market. The conclusions will be used to make assumptions on the structure of 
the different networks operated, in the following sections. For the purpose of 
this paper, the presentation will be more focused on the express segment. The 
chapter, covering comprehensively integrators’ strategies, is divided to three 
parts. Firstly, an historical presentation of the company is followed by a 
description of integrators’ market presence. Afterwards a review of integrators 
express business strategies will bring the reader to the conclusion of this 
chapter.  
4.2 Integrators’ presentation 
The four main integrators have been founded in different situations and time 
periods. These origins have influenced past and current strategies. 
Consequently, it is relevant to bring to the reader’s mind the integrators’ origins 
and evolutions over time.  
4.2.1 DHL 
Founded in 1969, by Adrian Dalsey, Larry Hilblom and Robert Lynn, DHL 
specialised in personal documents shipping from San Francisco to Honolulu 
(DHL, 2005). The company grew up rapidly and started international expansion 
in 1971 (see annexes).  In 1972, the network started serving Japan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Australia and in subsequent years, DHL launched 
services to Middle East, Latin America and Africa. In 1979, DHL extended its 
services to package deliveries as before that year only documents were 
shipped. 1983 and 1985 were very important years for DHL’s network due to 
the opening of two hubs, respectively, Cincinnati in the USA and Brussels in 
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Belgium. Then, the non U.S. part of the company’s operation was based in 
Brussels. In 1990, DHL made strategic alliances with Lufthansa and Japan 
Airlines. In 1993, DHL opened a new regional hub in the Middle East at Bahrain. 
In 1998, Deutsche Post became a shareholder of DHL. In 2002, Deutsche Post 
World Net completed a 100% shareholding of DHL. In 2004, the newly German 
integrator acquired Airborne to become the third US domestic express operator. 
Deutsch Post World Net operates in four corporate divisions; Mail, Express 
Logistic and financial services. The express and logistics divisions operate 
under DHL’s brand. DPWN Mail Corporation Division is the largest postal 
company in Europe. In 2004, DHL reinforced its presence in India acquiring 
68% in Blue Dart, the premium domestic courier and integrated air express 
package distribution company in India (DPWN, 2007).  
 
Nowadays, the express division accounts for 25.7% of group revenue, as 
shown in the figure below, and produced 17,195 million revenue in 2006.  
Figure 16: DPWN revenue by Division36 
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Since 2006, the express segment is the second activity of the German group, 
despite a revenue increase by 2.16% compared to 2005 as shown in figure 17. 
The express segment is the historic activity of the DHL brand but massive 
investment has been made on the logistic side recently. Moreover, pull down by 
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losses produced in the US market, the express division was slightly profitable in 
2006 but the situation has improved compared to the losses of 2005 as 
illustrated below.  During the last 7 years, this branch produced losses twice, in 
2002 and 2005. The Express EBIT performances are the worst in the group in 
2005. 
Figure 17: DHL Revenue and EBIT performances by business unit37 
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This situation is partly due to the nature of this business. Indeed, express 
business is capital intensive and requires heavy organisation throughout the 
world. In 2006, DHL Express worldwide employed 124,280 staff, operating at 36 
hubs 38with 72,000 vehicles and 420 aircraft39 (DPWN, 2007). Another reason is 
the situation of DHL express in the North American market and will be explained 
later in the market presence part.  
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4.2.2 FedEx 
Founded in 1971 by Frederick W. Smith, Federal Express really started its 
development in 1973 at Memphis Airport, the company’s main hub today 
(FedEx, 2007). Federal Express was a pioneer in the express transportation of 
documents and small parcels not heavier than 30 kg in 1973 (Chan, C 1994).  
The company operated originally a fleet of Falcon 20 and was the first cargo 
airline using jet aircraft. In 1977, the deregulation of the US domestic market 
appeared as a real driver for the company’s growth. Since this event the 
company was able to operate larger aircraft such as the Boeing 727 and 
McDonnell-Douglas DC-10 and so expand its operations. Intercontinental 
expansion began in 1984 with services to Europe and Asia. In 1988, the 
company launched direct scheduled cargo services to Japan. 1989 was an 
important year for FedEx expansion with the acquisition of Tiger international in 
February.  
Nowadays, the company is a major international group, mainly active in CEP 
and Freight markets, at both domestic and international levels. The express 
division produces 64% of FedEx Group’s revenues and 59.7% of group 
incomes as described in figures 18 and 19. While its core business remains 
express, it also offers traditional air freight services, same day and deferred 
deliveries, as well as warehousing and logistics, either integrally or through one 
of its sister companies. The group is present in four business segments: 
Express, Ground, Freight, and Kinko’s40. The four segments are managed as 
independent companies by the group.  
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Figure 18: FedEx 2007 Revenue split by business segment41 
FedEx Express
FedEx Ground 
FedEx Freight
FedEx Kinko's
 
Despite the expansion in new business areas, the American integrator 
continues to develop its express segment. Indeed, FedEx Express’ revenues 
grew since 1998 at an annual average of 7.1% and show a steady 
development. Moreover, this branch is the most profitable. FedEx Express 
produces 59.7% of the group operating incomes. Operating incomes increased 
by an annual average of 13.4% since 1998 and 21.1% during the last 4 years 
as presented in figure 20.   
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Figure 19: Operating income evolution by business segment42 
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 This division operates in two different segments of the express business: 
express packages and express freight. FedEx Express has an extensive air and 
ground network, delivering on average 3,265,000 packages everyday, in order 
to operate at an international level. 
4.2.3 TNT 
Established in 1946 by Ken Thomas, the company saw a rapid growth during 
the 1950’s in Australia, its home market. Since this period, the company has 
offered overnight express products and services, using surface transport such 
as road and rail transport. During the 1970s and 1980s, the company reached 
into new markets and expanded internationally, particularly in Europe, North 
America, and Brazil. The creation of the single market in Europe at the 
beginning of the 1990s 43 , allowed TNT to develop its European network. 
Indeed, TNT purchased a fleet of BAe 146 freighters and created the first pan-
European overnight express service. The rapid development of the company in 
the European market, using company acquisition, put TNT in financial 
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difficulties. At the same time the Dutch Post KPN, a national provider of mail, 
express and logistics services, developed from PTT Post, started its expansion 
in the international express market. In December 1996, KPN took over the 
Australian group.  After that, a long period of integration was necessary for the 
group and several outside core-business activities were sold. Since the 
conclusion of the recent logistic branch sale to Geodis, the group has been 
focused on two business segments: mail and express.  
 
The express activity is the main business of the Dutch group in terms of 
revenue. Indeed, in 2006, the express segment accounted for 60% of group 
revenue. 
Figure 20: TNT NV revenue split in 200644 
Non-
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company; -
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Moreover the TNT Express is also expanding faster than the mail branch. This 
is partly due to investments in this sector in different geographic places as will 
be discussed later. Since 2004, the latter business expanded by 21.12% 
instead of the 5.53% seen for the mail segment. The number of consignments 
carried has grown by 16% between 2002 and 2006. However, the Express 
business is not as profitable as the mail one. Despite a strong increase of 
53.44% between 2004 and 2006, it produces only 40% of the group operating 
incomes as described in figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Express and Mail operating performances45 
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 Another particularity is that TNT express’ activities are more focused on 
domestic and intra-regional markets in Europe and Asia than on intercontinental 
business but this will be developed later. According to the Dutch company, the 
biggest express markets are domestic.  
4.2.4 UPS 
Founded in 1907 by James Casey, the company started with private messenger 
and delivery services in Seattle. At the beginning, the company was called 
American Messenger Company. Over the time, the company changed business 
segment and began focusing on the parcel delivery business, first in Seattle and 
then on a domestic scale. Indeed, in 1919 the company expanded beyond 
Seattle and changed its name to become United Parcel Service. In the early 
1980’s, the company started to run an airline in order to support its new 
expansion internationally. The first European services started in 1976 
(Germany). Over the 1990’s, the group invested in different business activities 
such as finance, logistics, customs, freight movement, electronic commerce and 
venture capital. Despite these developments the group primary business 
remains time definite deliveries of packages and documents.  
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The story of UPS in Europe really started in the middle of the 1980’s, when the 
company launched its first European operation in Germany. Following this 
investment, UPS decided to build its own European network and had 
purchased, by the middle of the 1990s, parcel companies in all EU countries 
(TIACA, 2001). Nowadays, the company operates its European air hub at 
Cologne/Bonn and has European headquarters based in Brussels. UPS 
operates 150 intra-European flight segments and 133 intercontinental routes, 
from its hub at Cologne-Bonn Airport. The Worldwide network operates 268 
flights with in-house aircraft and charters a further 309 flights (Department of Air 
Transport, 2005). 
UPS business is segmented into three divisions: Domestic package, 
international package and Supply chain & freight. Consequently, it is not 
possible to determine the performance and the size of the express business 
within the group. It also means that, contrary to the other integrators, UPS is 
sharing common facilities between the different services. The main business 
segment is clearly the US domestic package weighting 62% of group operating 
revenues. International package is second with 21%. 
Figure 22: UPS revenue split by business segment46 
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However, over the past 6 years, UPS Supply Chain & Freight and UPS 
International package saw a significant increase in revenue; respectively by 
271% and 118%, but UPS Domestic Package grow only by 28%. One of the 
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reasons explaining this trend is the maturation of UPS core market, the US 
domestic market. Another reason is the importance of the investments done on 
the Supply Chain and the international packages sides. Moreover, figure 25 
illustrates the operating profit evolution through the different business 
segments. It shows the dominance of the US domestic business, acccounting 
74.2% of group operating profit in 2006, compared to 25.8% only for 
international package. However, the international business profits grow more 
rapidly47. In 2007, the domestic package segment produced significant losses, 
mainly due performances in the last quarter of the year.   
Figure 23: Operating Profit evolution per business segment48 
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In conclusion, UPS is trying to develop its product range in order to face 
aggressive competition in the CEP market.  
                                            
 
47
 + 442% between 1998 and 2007 
48
 UPS, 2007 
Chapter 4 - Integrators’ Strategy 
 
48 
4.3 Market Presence 
Network strategies were dependent on commercial strategies in the past. 
Hence, it is relevant to describe the market presence geographically but also in 
term of business segment before analysing the current networks. This part 
presents Integrators’ market position in the different geographic areas: Europe, 
North America, Asia and the emerging market. Integrators’ business needs to 
be analysed through a worldwide perspective, as strategies selected in a 
specific geographic area are consequences of market situations in other parts 
of the world. This is the reason the situation in North America and Asia are also 
described. For the purpose of this study, the CEP market only will be 
considered.  
4.3.1 Europe 
According to DPWN the European CEP market was worth 27.5 billion 49 in 
2004. 
Over the years, parcel alliances and public postal operators have tried to 
penetrate the European market by acquiring parcel and express companies in 
order to create international air and road express networks. Europe has been 
the place of intense consolidation in recent years and now contains five major 
players with Deutsche Post (DHL), FedEx Corp. (FedEx), Geopost-Groupe (La 
Poste), United Parcel Service Inc (UPS) and KPN (TNT N.V) as presented in 
figure 24  below (TNT, 2006). Moreover, several alliances have been created in 
the market such as UPS with Poste Italian, TNT with Geopost, and FedEx with 
Geodis. Despite consolidation and alliances, the market is still more fragmented 
than in the United States (TNT, 2006). 
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 DHL 
DHL is the Europe largest provider of courier, express and parcel services, 
owning 30% market share in international express market to / from Europe in 
2005, as shown in figure 24.  
Figure 24: Europe international CEP market split in 2005 50(%) 
Other; 20,9%
DHL; 30,0%
UPS; 19,4%
TNT; 15,1%
FedEx; 7,9%
La Poste; 4,5%
Royal Mail; 
2,2%
 
Moreover, counting for 56% of DHL Express revenue in 2006, Europe is its core 
market and the company continues to invest in this area, as described in figure 
25. The Express sector has benefited the Deutsche Post position in Germany, 
the leading European economy. Time definite services are performing well in 
the European market: pre-12 deliveries are available in 27 European countries, 
74% of all business addresses in Europe and Germany (DPWN, 2006).  
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Figure 25: Geographic split of DHL Express revenue in 200651 
Europe 
Americas
Asia 
Pasific
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 FedEx 
FedEx’s position in Europe is weaker than its direct competitors. Indeed, the 
company is only the fourth operator of international express shipments to and 
from Europe in 2005 (figure 24) with only 8% of market share. However, 
fourteen years after FedEx withdrew its European market presence; the North 
American group decided to come back in the market with the bid over ANC 
holdings, a domestic express player in the UK (Air cargo News, 2007). The 
reasons for the drop during spring 1992 were on-going losses and a decision to 
focus on intercontinental services to and from Europe (Air cargo News, 2007). 
So far, FedEx has worked with Business Post in the UK market and will 
continue until the integration of ANC is completed. The current strategy of the 
American group is to reinforce its European presence, as illustrated by the 
acquisition of Flying-Cargo, a former Hungarian subcontractor.   
 TNT 
TNT express has developed over time an extensive worldwide network 
specialised in the CEP market. However, the network of the Dutch company is 
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considered weaker than its competitors, due to a lack of market coverage in the 
US as presented later.  
In the intra-European and European International CEP markets52, the company 
benefits from a strong position. Second largest operator behind Deutsche Post 
group in the first market, with 11% market share (TNT, 2007), the Dutch group 
has an interesting third position in the second place behind DHL and UPS, with 
15.1% (DPWN 2007). 53Considering the narrow market, according to TNT’s 
definition presented below, the Dutch company ‘s market share in Europe is 
about 22%. 
Figure 26: Narrow European Market Split*54 
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The narrow market is including the orange area in the figure 27, time certain 
and next day up to 1,000 kg. 
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Figure 27: Narrow market presentation55 
 
Europe is the express division home market, where TNT offers express door to 
door deliveries of documents, parcels, and freight in 34 countries. Indeed, in 
2006, the European market counted for 81.6% of the express revenues. 
However, the international revenue outside Europe grew more quickly, by 
25.4% between 2004 and 2006. 
Figure 28: Express revenues split by geographical area56 
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
2004 2005 2006
M
ill
io
n
s
 

Express Europe Express International
 
                                            
 
55
 TNT 2007 
56
 TNT , 2006 
Chapter 4 - Integrators’ Strategy 
 
53 
TNT express division tries to consolidate its European position through 
acquisition and organic growth. It acquired TG+, the Spanish largest domestic 
express company. In 2004, TNT started to invest 36 million to increase the 
capacity of its main air hub in Liege. TNT annual growth in eastern countries 
exceeds 20%. 
 UPS 
UPS is the second largest operator in the international European market 
following DHL, accounting for 20%. This position is the result of a huge 
investment and long term position in the market started in 1976. The European 
headquarters are based in Brussels, despite having the hub in Cologne. The 
UPS European business area covers 57 countries. UPS’s European export 
volume increased by 13% in 2006 compared to 200557. International volume to 
and from Europe increased by 12.4% for the year, due to volume growth in 
Canada and Europe, which also benefited from the acquisition of Messenger 
Service Stolica S.A. and Lynx Express Ltd (UPS, 2006). Indeed, the group has 
planned to reinforce its position investing in the expansion of its European hub, 
plus purchasing Stolica SA 58  and Lynx Express Ltd 59 in 2005. However, 
excluding the impact of acquisitions, international volume increased by 3.7% to 
and from Europe.  
 
Finally, UPS employs around 32,000 staff in Europe, and has a fleet of more 
than 7,000 ground vehicles. It operates 150 intra-European flight segments and 
133 on intercontinental routes, both centred on its hub at Cologne-Bonn Airport. 
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4.3.2 US America 
The mature US market counts an estimated market volume of 44.8 billion 60 in 
2004 which represents the main CEP market in the world. This strategic 
geographic place is dominated by FedEx and UPS but DHL has invested 
heavily to develop its market share. 
 DHL 
Strategic target of the company for several years, the American market is the 
world’s largest express market. DHL’s presence in the market is justified by the 
globalisation and the guarantee of long business success in other markets e.g. 
US-Europe and US-China market. DHL provides domestic and international 
express services supported by an air and ground based transport network 
(DPWN 2007). However, DHL operations are small in the US domestic market 
compared to its competitors, with 13% of market share. 
Figure 29: US International CEP market split in 2005(%)61 
FedEx; 32%
UPS; 18%DHL; 13%
USPS; 4%
Other; 33%
 
Hence, DHL Express has planned more involvement in the US domestic 
express market, as it is the world’s largest market for express. It tries to achieve 
this with investments and acquisitions, accepting temporary losses from 
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operating activities. Airborne acquisition in 2004 and Polar partnership 
reinforced its position (Oujamaa, 2006). In 2006, the American continents 
represented the second biggest express market for DHL, with a share of 24.5% 
of express revenues, despite an activity slow down between 2005 and 2006 by 
1.95% as shown in figure 27.  
 FedEx 
With a 32% market share in the US international CEP, FedEx express is the 
leader in this market. Using an extensive network, FedEx business, particularly 
in the express package and freight markets is both highly competitive and 
sensitive to price and service (FedEx, 2007). FedEx’s main competitors are the 
other package delivery companies in the US domestic market, the other, 
namely 62 , passenger airlines offering express package services, regional 
express delivery concerns, airfreight forwarders and the U.S. Postal Service.  
In the USA, FedEx Express Packages offers overnight and deferred services of 
packages up to 150 pounds 63  each. The service guarantees time definite 
delivery in one and three business days within the US.  
 TNT 
TNT is not a major player in the North American market. The Dutch group offers 
CEP international services to and from this area, but on a limited scale 
compared to its competitors. Indeed, TNT provides international express 
services to and from the North East and the West coast, operating night trans-
atlantic flights to New York in order to offer next day deliveries to 15 large cities 
(TNT, 2006). 
However, TNT does not plan to invest in North America, considering the market 
mature, highly competitive and dominated by two major integrators: FedEx and 
UPS. 
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 UPS 
Second largest operator in the international US market, UPS accounted with 
FedEx for 50% of market share, in 2005. The American integrator produced 
US$47.5 billion in this market. Domestic Package services include time-definite 
delivery of letters, documents, and packages throughout the US. Next day 
delivery mainly uses air transport but also contains surface transport (UPS, 
2006). UPS freighters carry mainly express small-packages on domestic routes. 
It accounts for 85% of the capacity as illustrated in figure 30 below. The other 
15% contains freight, from both USPS and Global Freight Exchange (GF-X)64. It 
is interesting to see that UPS also carries shipments for a competitor, USPS; 
however this has been a small amount up to now. 
Figure 30: UPS domestic flight loading profile65 
 
4.3.3 Asia 
The Asian CEP market met a rapid expansion in the last decade and benefited 
more recently from massive investment by integrators. This new strategic area 
influenced the evolution of worldwide and European networks.  
 DHL 
Accounting for 33% of market share in 2005 (see figure below), DHL is the 
largest operator in the international Asiatic market, a consequence of a long 
                                            
 
64
 a cargo portal used by shippers 
65
 Oujamaa, 2006 
Chapter 4 - Integrators’ Strategy 
 
57 
term positioning in this market. Indeed, with 6% market share, DHL is the 
largest international provider in the intra-Asiatic market, dominated by regional 
operators. The Asia Pacific market weights only for 13.7% of DHL’s express 
business in 200666, but benefits from a rapid increase in the recent years67. The 
strength of the DHL network is the result of strong partnerships built over time 
with Sinotrans68, Transmile and Cathay Pacific. However, parcels market leader 
in Japan, Yamato Transport, ended its long-running partnership with UPS and 
launched its own international parcel service. 
Figure 31: Asia International CEP market split in 2005(%)69 
DHL; 33,0%
UPS; 10,0%
TNT; 7,0%
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Other; 28,0%
 
 
In India, DHL Express has recently opened several new facilities, under the 
Indian subsidiary Blue Dart Express, and domestic air express market leader. 
Furthermore investing in facilities, the German company has expanded its 
network and capacity by introducing two Boeing 757 freighters that enabled it to 
offer 21 new routes (TNT, 2006). 
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 FedEx 
Representing 22% of the Asia International CEP market in 2005, FedEx is the 
second largest player in this market. Moreover, the American integrator has 
decided to emphasise its development in the fastest growing market, Asia. It 
acquired its domestic Chinese business partner and the DTW Group for 
international connections. 
This purchase will increase FedEx penetration in the Chinese domestic market. 
In India, FedEx took over its Indian service partner, Prakash Air Freight, and will 
be able to offer a portfolio of international and domestic express services. 
 TNT 
Accounting only for 7% market share, TNT is the fourth largest operator in the 
Asia international market in 2005. However, the new TNT strategy for the next 
few years revealed at the beginning of the year is targeting this market. The 
strategy adopted by the integrator is already visible in Asia with the delivery of 
the first Boeing 747-400ERF 70and the acquisition of two subsidiaries, Hoau in 
China and Speedage in India (Air Cargo News, 19/01/2007). The future 
objective of TNT is to become China’s largest road network operator offering 
comprehensive road coverage in 1,100 locations in China. TNT targets an 
annual 30% growth over the period 2006-2010. In order to comply with these 
objectives the company strategy is focused on two point. First, the company 
seeks to expand its international network between the country and Europe and 
secondly TNT develops an extensive domestic network. TNT flies a Boeing 
747-400 ERF four times a week between Shanghai and Liege. The plane 
leaves China with a full payload and returns half full. Moreover, with the 
acquisition of Hoau, a road freight company, TNT benefits from a large 
domestic network.  
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 UPS 
UPS is the third largest operator in the international Asiatic market. Moreover, 
the company invests heavily in this area. UPS increased Chinese connections 
up to 21 flights, including 9 weekly Shanghai-USA flights and 5 weekly 
Shanghai-Cologne flights (UPS, 2006). 
 
4.4 Integrators’ Express business strategy 
Following historical presentations and geographic market presence description, 
the integrators’ business strategies will be explained with a natural focus on the 
European area.   
4.4.1 DHL strategy  
Networks are considered strategically as a competitive advantage at DHL, 
specifically in the express branch as declared in the German group annual 
report (DPWN, 2006). “We intend to maintain and further extend our position in 
the highly-competitive express market. To do this we will require efficient 
transport networks that provide the capacity required to meet the exacting 
demand of our customers in respect of posting and delivery times”. DHL 
strategy is visibly looking at its product portfolio, alliances and its fleet.  
A very sensitive strategic decision has to be taken into account and will be 
further discussed in chapter 6. DHL has made the decision to move its central 
hub location from Brussels to Leipzig. This move is motivated by several 
transportation issues but also by strategic ones. Indeed, Leipzig airport benefits 
from a more central position in mainland Europe and a direct access to the 
growing Eastern Europe market. The benefits of this move will be discussed in 
chapter 6. 
 DHL express products 
DHL express products focus on both companies and private customers to offer 
courier, express and parcels services via three product lines defined according 
to speed of delivery: same day, time definite and day definite deliveries. The 
Chapter 4 - Integrators’ Strategy 
 
60 
three product lines are provided to customers in each of the four geographic 
areas served by the German integrator, Europe, America, Asia Pacific, 
Emerging Markets (DPWN, 2006).  
 DHL Alliances 
DHL has made in the past years a series of alliances in order to strengthen its 
network. One the main reasons explaining these partnerships results from the 
fact that DHL has elected not to follow UPS and FedEx strategies by investing 
in their own fleet of wide-body freighters, but have instead created partnerships 
with large cargo carriers to guarantee capacity (Air Cargo News, March 2007). 
Indeed, Becasse 71  explained that investing in a proper aircraft fleet is not 
compatible with DHL’s strategy. “The longer the flying distances are, larger 
aircraft are needed”. DHL as an express carrier has the particularity to fly every 
day Monday to Friday. That means, in reference to the fact that a big freight 
aircraft has a capacity of 100 tonnes that the company has to find 500 tonnes 
per week to fill in the aircraft. It can result in an overcapacity situation for some 
routes and later driving a decrease in the quality of the service. Indeed time 
sensitivity will be affected by the need to consolidate enough freight to fly 
(Interview with J. Becasse, 3rd July 2007). 
 
First of all, to strengthen its position in the international US market, DHL 
acquired, in October 2006, a 49% interest in Polar Air Cargo Worldwide. The 
German integrator also signed an agreement with the North American carrier 
over twenty years to guarantee DHL long term access to air freight capacities 
on trans-pacific routes. For Draycott 72 , the reason explaining this new 
agreement between Polar and DHL is due to a will of developing trans-pacific 
connections. There was an existing agreement between Northwest Airline and 
DHL to operate this route, but Northwest operated an old freighter fleet that 
needed replacement.  Regarding the short and middle term, this agreement 
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would not change the US network structure despite an increase of capacity to 
the west coast (Interview with J. Becasse, 3rd July 2007).  In the US domestic 
market, DHL Express is a major forwarder. DHL does not operate an airline for 
its US domestic air shipments, but has contracted an agreement with Astar and 
ABX. These two carriers operate the DHL domestic network using Boeing 727, 
A300 and Boeing 767 aircraft (Interview with A. Draycott August 2007).  ABX Air 
was formed in 1980. The carrier was formerly a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Airborne Inc. DHL acquired the ground and related operations of Airborne in 
August 2003. DHL was not able to acquire the air carrier part of Airborne 
because of the US laws and DOT state that non-US citizens may not own more 
than 25% of a US air carrier. DHL is ABX Air primary customer. ABX Air 
revenues come from the ACMI and hub service agreement with DHL (Oujamaa, 
2006). ABX Air provides only air transport within North America. Next day 
services are primarily transported by ABX Air aircraft fleet and are sorted 
through ABX Air’s nightly hub operations. Through the hub service agreement, 
ABX Air operates and maintains DHL’s primary US sort facility in Wilmington, 
Ohio. The Wilmington facility handles nearly one million pieces during every 
night operation for each weekday (Oujamaa, 2006). ABX Air has a freighter fleet 
of 119 freighters that contains Boeing 767s, DC-8s and DC-9s, all converted 
from passenger aircraft.  
 
Secondly, since March 2006, DHL and Cathay Pacific have collaborated on 
overnight cargo/passengers flights on Hong Kong to Osaka, Seoul, Taipei and 
Singapore routes. The Cathay all cargo subsidiary Air Hong Kong (AHK) 
operating to several Asiatic destinations such as Tokyo, has been owned 73by 
both companies since 2002.  
 
Thirdly, an alliance is working between DHL, Lufthansa and JAL. 25% of DHL 
international is owned by JAL and Lufthansa shares and a strategic cooperation 
                                            
 
73
 40% by DHL and 60% by Cathay Pacific 
Chapter 4 - Integrators’ Strategy 
 
62 
has been stated between the German groups on a joint operation on five 
international routes. In 2005, DHL formed a joint venture with Lufthansa Cargo 
called ‘LifeConEx’ based in Florida, offering a temperature-controlled specialist 
transport for pharmaceuticals, biotech and healthcare products (DOT, 2005). 
Moreover, according to the newspaper “Air cargo News”(March 2007), DHL and 
LH 74are in negotiations to create a new partnership that could be even bigger 
than DHL’s recent tie up with Polar Air Cargo in the US. Two other airlines were 
in competition to create this alliance, Emirates Skycargo and Cargolux 
 
These alliances have a significant impact in the network strategy chosen. The 
first alliance aims to reinforce DHL’s position in the market with a specialist 
carrier.  For the second one, it allowed to strengthen DHL’s service network in 
Asia-Pacific and to help consolidate Hong Kong as a key express logistics 
centre of Asia. The third alliance is seen as partnership with major carriers in 
order to associate in the transport chain and can be explained by the DHL fleet 
strategy.  
 DHL fleet 
As presented in the figure below, DHL owns a large fleet. According to the 
graph DHL has the second largest fleet of the four integrators behind FedEx. 
However, compared to FedEx or UPS, DHL fleet is mainly composed of small 
and medium sized aircraft. In Europe, mostly three aircraft types are operated 
throughout the network, the Boeing 757 for regular links, such as BRU-LYS, the 
Airbus A300-600 on larger routes and the ATR 42 on feeder flights i.e. 
Brussels-Sofia as the routes not driving lots of freight.  
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Figure 32: Number aircrafts per integrators' fleet 
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4.4.2 FedEx strategy  
FedEx is not solely one of the main integrators in the world; it is also the biggest 
scheduled freight carrier both in term of tonnes carried and tonnes-kilometers in 
2006. As presented in figure 33, FedEx carried over 7.1 millions Tonnes of 
shipments75, 67% more than UPS, second integrator in term of freight carried. 
In 2006, FedEx carried 56.8% of integrators scheduled freight tonnage. This 
information illustrates FedEx’s strategy. Indeed, the gap between the American 
integrator and its international competitor is mostly due to the result of two 
factors. First, FedEx express is the leading company in North America, the 
largest domestic CEP market, as shown previously. Secondly, the American 
integrators’ past strategies has been focused on business integration. For 
example, it operates the largest freighter aircraft fleet in the world, which clearly 
demonstrates its strategy to realise the transportation in-house. 
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Figure 33: Scheduled Freight Tonnes Carried by Integrator in 200676 
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Recently, the strategic orientation of the North American integrator is focused 
on two point. First of all, the company plans to reinforce its position in the highly 
competitive US market, and secondly to invest in the main markets outside the 
US. The selected markets are Europe and Asia. The last demonstration of 
FedEx’s investment in Europe is given by the acquisition of ANC holding. The 
British company is specialised in domestic road express business. The FedEx 
decision can be explained by a need for economies of scale to reduce the cost 
per move in Europe. This business is a potential driver for international traffic. 
“FedEx in Europe is like DHL in USA, they need larger operations in order to 
offer competitive products as it is a resource intensive business”. However, this 
acquisition presents a potential risk as it will need a compromise between 
higher expectation of the customers and very low margins but also because 
there is a threat of customer retention. “FedEx’s challenge will be to increase 
the volume in order to increase revenue and margins (Interview with A. Draycott 
in August 2007)”.  
 
Moreover, looking at the evolution of FedEx traffic presented in the figure 34 
below, the domination of domestic business is clear. The domestic traffic share 
is the highest compared to its competitors with 75%. Operating mostly in the 
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Intra-European market, EAT and TNT Airways have a very limited share of 
domestic traffic due to the size of the European countries.  
Figure 34: Scheduled freight Tonnes carried split by integrator and traffic characteristic77 
*Traffic incl. EAT and DHL International EC
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However, looking at the trend in particular since 2003, the curve shows a faster 
development of the international business in the last five years which clearly 
proves its international orientation. 
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Figure 35: FedEx traffic split between domestic and international78 
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 FedEx Aircraft Fleet 
FedEx operates the largest freighter aircraft fleet in the world with 669 aircraft, 
(see figure below). Moreover, the company owns the largest fleet of wide-body 
aircrafts, with 264 aircraft. The aircraft mix is composed of the three aircraft 
class used in the market: small turboprops, small freighters such as B737,and 
large freighters eg D-11.  
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Tableau 4: FedEx Fleet in 200779 
Aircraft Type 2007
Cessna 208B 243
Boeing 727-200 94
Airbus A310-200/300 66
Airbus A300-600 60
Boeing MD11 58
Boeing MD10-10 49
ATR-42 29
Boeing DC10-10 14
Boeing DC10-30 13
ATR-72 13
Cessna 208A 10
Fokker F-27   8
Boeing MD10-30 7
Boeing 757-200 4
Boeing 727-100 1
Boeing 777F  –
Aircraft Fleet Total 669 
 
 FedEx Products 
FedEx’s services portfolio is presented in the table below. The North American 
carrier product is based on three types of services, “next day early morning”, 
“next day”, and “day definite”. 
Table 1: FedEx service portfolio in Europe80 
Service Description
FedEx International Priority Next Day Service Within Europe
FedEx Europe First Next Day early morning delivery by 9:00, 9:30 or 10:00 am
FedEx 10 kg and 25 kg Box Next Business Day
Service Description
FedEx International Priority 1-2 Business Days
FedEx Europe First Before 8:00 or 8:30 am to destination across
FedEx 10 kg and 25 kg Box 1-2 Business Days
FedEx International Economy 4-5 Busness Days
FedEx International Prority DirectDistribution
Intra European Services
International Services
 
Looking at the performances of FedEx’s main products shows a clear 
domination of the US market. Indeed, US overnight delivery accounts for 38.7% 
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of the revenues. However, it is interesting to realise that the main FedEx 
express product was in fact its International priority, with 30.7% of the express 
revenues in 2007. This information needs to be taken into account while 
analysing FedEx’s network strategy, as it could be a factor influencing network 
design. 
Figure 36: Express Revenue split between FedEx express products in 200781 
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4.4.3 TNT strategy 
Recently, TNT has defined a new strategic orientation in order to grow in the 
near future. The new strategy is named “Focus on Network”. The first symptoms 
of this strategy are already visible and explain the current situation of the Dutch 
carrier. TNT’s strategy will be presented under a different view through a 
commercial aspect first, followed by alliances and finishing with transportation.  
 Focus On Network 
The new TNT strategy 82for the next years revealed at the beginning of 2007 by 
the company is focused on its network. The strategy adopted by the integrator, 
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already visible with the delivery of the first Boeing 747-400ERF 83 and the 
acquisition of the leading Brazilian express company “Expresso Mercúrio”, is to 
develop its position in the emerging market (Air Cargo News, January 2007). 
Indeed, the new strategy is focusing on two points. First, the company plans to 
strengthen its position in the European market and secondly to invest in 
emerging markets in order to become the market leader in these areas as 
confirmed by the express managing director Marie Christine Lombard: “our 
strategic objective is to become number one in selected emerging markets” (Air 
Cargo News, January 2007). Several acquisitions illustrate this trend such as 
Hoau in China, Speedage in India and Expresso Mercúrio in Brazil. Moreover 
TNT is now looking at less developed markets and has decided not to go in the 
highly competitive American market such as DHL (Air Cargo News, January 
2007). 
The main objective of the company’s strategy, illustrated in figure 37 below, is to 
make denser the international network in order to benefit from economies of 
scale. In 2005, only 20% of express revenue was produced by the international 
network against 80% in Europe (Abn Amro, 2005). 
  
Figure 37: Pushing volume through the network84 
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Another feature of its new strategy is the sale of its logistics branch in order to 
focus on the CEP market. According to ABN AMRO (2006), this loss does not 
make TNT weaker strategically. Operational synergies in Mail and Express can 
be an opportunity for closer co-operation and so economy of scale, particularly 
in the European Mail Network.  
To conclude this section, the strength of the express branch of the group is a 
strong position in the European market and a growing business in Asia. The 
weakness could be the weak presence of TNT in North America. The threat of 
TNT at the moment is coming from the competition increasing capacity in its 
core market. 
 TNT Products 
Similarly with TNT’s strategy the company services portfolio also contrasts with 
its competitors. Instead of a “one stop shop” strategy, TNT’s express division 
has chosen to focus on B2B express market. Moreover, contrary to FedEx or 
DHL strategies, TNT has decided to sell its logistic division in 2006. This activity 
no longer suited the company strategy. There were two main reasons 
explaining this decision (TNT, 2007). First of all, according to the Dutch 
company, there were few synergies between express and logistics. Secondly, 
the logistics unit margin pulled down from 6% in the 1990’s to below 4% (TNT, 
2006). 
 
TNT express services include time or day definite delivery, door to door 
collection and delivery, international customs clearance, full track and trace, 
proof of delivery and round the clock support. Four services form the core part 
of TNT’s portfolio: 
• 9:00 Express is an international time-guaranteed delivery service before 
9:00 am the next business day.  
• 12:00 express is a similar product than the first one but the delivery time 
limit is 12:00 am.  
• Global express, is an international delivery service before the end of local 
business hour the next day.  
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• Economy express is a day definite delivery service. 
 TNT Aircraft Fleet  
TNT’s aircraft fleet is the smallest of the four integrators, with 44 aircraft. TNT 
fleet is mainly composed of small freighter aircraft. For instance, 45% of the 
fleet is composed of BAe 146. TNT operates the greater fleet of the freighter 
BAe146. TNT’s limited fleet is the result of a strategy focused on an intra-
regional ground network connected using commercial flights capacity. 
However, in the framework of its new strategy “Focus on Network”, TNT has 
received its first Boeing 747-400 ERF (Air Cargo News, January 2007). The 
aircraft are used for expanding routes to China. Indeed the first aircraft will be 
used on the Shanghai – Liege trade line.  
Figure 38: TNT fleet in 200685 
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 TNT Alliances  
In the past two years the Dutch group acquired a series of specialised 
companies in order to consolidate the whole network, particularly in emerging 
countries. The purchases of TG+, Hoau In 2005; Speedage in 2006 and 
Mercurio in 2007 show a real strategic orientation towards emerging markets. 
TG+ acquisition is slightly different and enters in the strategy focus on 
strengthening the European network. 
4.4.4 UPS Strategy 
DHL strategy has been focused on aggressive expansion in the past, and 
recently, the carrier has decided to invest in its infrastructure in order to support 
the worldwide network. As shown in the figure below, UPS’s position in the 
Express is strong. However, UPS data needs to be considered carefully as the 
different business segments are not separated in UPS contrary to its 
competitors. 
Figure 39: Express Operating Revenue 2004-2006 
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 UPS product portfolio 
Six types of services are offered by the company in the European market as 
illustrated in the table below. The three cores products of integrators are 
present, 09:00 am next day, 12:00 next day and end of business day.  
Table 2: FedEx service portfolio86 
Service
1-3 Business Days Delivery typically by 8:30 or 9:00 a.m. UPS Express Plus
1-3 Business Days Delivery typically by 10:30 a.m. or 12:00 noon UPS Express NA1
1-3 Business Days Delivery typically by 10:30 a.m. or 12:00 noon UPS Express
1-5 Business Days Delivery by end of day UPS Express Saver
2-5 Business Days Delivery by end of day UPS Expedited
Day Definite by date scheduled Delivery during the day UPS Standard
Delivery Commitment
Export and Import (Where Available)
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has given an overview of the four integrators’ past, current and 
future strategies.  
 
The chapter has first presented the company through an historical description. 
Then an analysis of market presence per geographic region has given the 
reader an understanding of the position and the role of Europe for the big four. 
Several points need to be taken into account for the following analysis. First of 
all, the express business remains the main or one the main activities of each 
integrator. Secondly, the express business is defined as capital intensive and 
requires heavy network structures. Consequently, integrators have invested 
massively, particularly in the developing market in the recent years. In Europe, 
DHL remains the market leader, UPS is the second largest operator resulting 
heavy investments. TNT is in third position and benefits synergy with the mail 
part of the group. Finally, FedEx is coming back to the intra-European market 
through local express company acquisition. FedEx is trying to drive more 
volumes in order to benefit economies of scale and improves the quality of its 
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products’ range. Thirdly, integrators have developed different transportation 
strategies. FedEx, biggest international scheduled freight carrier both in term of 
freight carried and freight-kilometres, is following a strategy based on 
integration. Indeed, FedEx owns the largest freighters fleet in the world in order 
to operate in-house air transportation in its home market but also internationally. 
FedEx also produces most of its revenue with its international products. At the 
other end of the scale, TNT, with a fleet of 44 aircrafts relies heavily in third 
party carriers and partnerships. Moreover, the Dutch integrators’ strategy is 
more focus on domestic and intra-regional market than international and trans-
continental connections.  
This chapter revealed significant differences between integrators in term of 
market presence and transportation strategy. The author believes that this two 
components influence networks’ configuration and hub selection. This 
statement will be analysed and discussed in the following chapters. 
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5 Research Methodology 
5.1 Chapter overview 
Having established objectives in chapter 1 and conducted an analysis of 
existing information and theoretical literature on the subject in chapters 2, 3 and 
4, it is now possible to specify research propositions that will guide the 
collection and analysis of the empirical data. 
This chapter, first, presents the analytical points and approaches to treat the 
objectives. Then a rapid review of the analytical methods considered will be 
given to the reader before a clear description of the research design including 
data collection and the selected analytical method. 
5.2 Research Approach 
In order to identify integrators’ hub and spoke air network configurations in 
Europe, but also their strategies and the factors influencing those 
configurations, the analysis will be based on two points.  
First of all, integrators’ network designs will be compared and analysed taking 
into account theoretical rules from chapter 2 and strategies detailed in chapter 
4.  
The second point will be treated as follow. The potential change in DHL’s 
network organisation will be determined, using map and strategy analysis. 
Then, the hub location both when serving own network and top European 
markets will be analysed. From the result, conclusions will either confirm or 
refute Doganis and Del Marmol’s87 statement presented in the next chapter.  
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5.3 Analytical methods considered 
Based on Burghout researches (2006) three methodologies have been 
considered: the graph theoretical approach, the hub location–allocation model 
and the concentration measures. 
5.3.1 The graph theoretical approach 
The graph theoretical approach, mainly used between the 60’s and the 80’s, 
determines the spatial characteristics of networks. It defines “a network as a set 
of nodes and the latter as connection between the nodes”. According to 
Burghout, (2006), despite its large impact, this model “underestimates the 
dimension of a network”. The graph theoretical approach has contributed to the 
conceptualisation of airline networks, and the creation of different graph 
structures.  
5.3.2 The hub location-allocation approach 
The second model, the “hub location-allocation”, aims to optimize spatially the 
hub and spoke (Burghout, 2006). This model uses two different notions, the hub 
and the node. From this model, hub and spokes are seen as networks where a 
large number of direct connections are replaced with fewer indirect connections 
(O’Kelly and Miller, 1994). The hub location-allocation model has been used for 
hub network design problems. According to Burghout (2006) it is basically a 
problem involving a decision model. In the decision process to establish a hub 
network design, several questions are relevant (Burghout, 2006): 
 Hub location? 
 How to assign non-hub origin and non-hub destination traffics to the 
hub? 
 How to link the hubs? 
 How to route the traffic between origin and destination over the resulting 
network? 
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5.3.3 Concentration model 
The third model according to Burghout is the concentration measure with the 
relation between the concentration of population and the hub location, 
developed by Reynolds-Feighan. However, the concentration measure has 
been applied to evaluate the concentration of traffic flow at the hub.  
Applied by Wojahn (2001) to analyse the concentration of traffic flow and 
characterise the network structure, this model is excellent for the purpose of this 
analysis. This tool allows calculating several indexes to determine a hubbing 
index. In order to realise the calculation, traffic data are needed, such as the 
number of departing flights and capacity offered from the airport on departing 
flights. The application of this method to airline networks as hubbing indices is 
relatively easy. If the hubbing index is low, that means a significant share of 
traffic is served by direct flights, using point to point connections. The networks 
are then ranked from the most concentrated to the least concentrated as shown 
in the table below (Wojahn, 2001). 
Table 3: Ranking of networks under hubbing indices88 
Networks
Measures
Concentration Ratio
McShan-Windle index 
Herfindal index 
Theil index 
Coefficient of variation 
Gini index
DHL UPSTNTFedEx
 
 
The concentration model is the ideal methodology for the specific requirements 
of this paper. However, it can not be applied due to a lack of relevant data. 
However, the first 2 methods have been used for the conception of the selected 
methods described in the following section. 
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5.4 Analytical method selected 
The analytical methodology applied during this study is a combination of three 
techniques. Consequently, this study does not apply every technique 
considered due to data limitations. Indeed, the concentration measure cannot 
be used to assess the role of the central hub in the network due to a lack of 
network data. This analysis has been carried out with the use of quantitative 
and qualitative data.  
 
In order to identify and compare integrators network configuration, map 
comparison and hub location-allocation approach presented above have been 
used. These techniques are further developed below. The second point focused 
on central hub location and the case of DHL decision has been analysed 
applying an economic analysis and weighted distance calculations.  
5.4.1 Map Comparison 
Map comparison analysis is coupled with location-allocation approach. This 
analysis determines the network configuration selected by integrators. The 
process relies on theoretical models presented in chapter 2 coupled with 
explanation and data collected during interviews to support the results. 
5.4.2 GDP & GDP growth comparison 
In order to analyse the location of the central hub and particularly the choice of 
DHL, an economic comparison between the western and eastern European part 
have been done. The indicator selected in the process is the Gross Domestic 
Product. 
 GDP Growth comparison 
The comparison has been done between the former fifteen European countries 
and eastern countries, selected in accordance with geographic and economic 
situation. The fifteen European countries selected are the ones part of the first 
stage of European Union. The Eastern European countries are Bulgaria, Czech 
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Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey.  
The value used for the calculation is an indexed GDP value at market price 
based on 1995 value (100= 1995).  
 GDP comparison 
The calculation compares, this time, countries located in or around the triangle 
defined by Del Marmol89; Belgium, France, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Luxemburg with the same eastern countries selected above. The 
value selected is the GDP at current price in  million. 
5.4.3 Weighted Distance calculation 
Weighted distance calculation allows a more accurate assessment of central 
hub location, taking into consideration the distance and the economic interest of 
market served.  
 Weighted Distance to serve own network 
The first calculation is related to the network served by the hub. The weighted 
distance calculation is based on several data. First of all, there is a need for 
destination served by integrators network. This information is available with the 
network maps. Secondly, distance between the hub and the spokes are 
required in the calculation. Thirdly, the GDP of each countries served by the 
network is part of the calculation. GDP value selected is again at current price in 
 million. The formula is following:  
( )


GDP
cedisGDP tan*
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 Weighted Distance to serve top European destinations 
The purpose of the second calculation is to reduce the impact of the network 
size in the assessment process. Indeed, in the case of FedEx and DHL 
networks, the distortion in the comparison is clear. FedEx’s network is relatively 
reduced and focus on main European markets compared to DHL ones covering 
an extensive area in Europe including some remote areas. So, for this 
calculation hub location assessment is done on the same market basis, the top 
European markets. The selection process uses the 80/20 method. Selected 
countries account for 72% of the total European GDP 90and 22% of the total 
number of countries91. Several destinations per country have been taken into 
consideration in order to cover different economic areas. Fifteen cities have 
been selected. The number of cities per country depends on the economic 
weight of the country. So, Germany producing the greater amount of value 
added in Europe, obtained the greater number of cities. The allocation process 
has been done as follows: 
 1: Germany= 4 cities (Berlin, Cologne, Frankfurt, Munich) 
 2: UK = 3 cities (London, EMA, Edinburgh) 
 3: France = 3 cities (Paris, Lyon, Nice) 
 4: Italy=2 (Roma, Bergamo (Milan)) 
 5: Spain=2 (Madrid, Barcelona) 
 6: Netherlands=1 (Amsterdam) 
Cities have been selected on integrators’ interest basis, taking into account 
destinations served in the integrators’ network. 
5.5   Data Collection 
The following section is concerned with a discussion of the primary and 
secondary data sources used during this study. The analytical methodology 
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uses both quantitative and qualitative data in order to achieve a complete 
analysis.  
 Interviews 
Research interview can be defined as “a two person conversation initiated by 
the interviewer for the specific purposes of obtaining research-relevant 
information” (Gardiner, 2006). The main advantage of interviews is the 
possibility to target and focus directly on the research topic but also to be 
flexible and adaptable to the person interviewed. It was planned to meet several 
persons from different parts of the industry. People targeted were specialist 
from each integrated carriers, airport used as hubs for integrators and academic 
specialists. It was crucial for this study to obtain opinions and information from 
each company concerned.  
 
Two types of interviews have been realised, personal and phone interviews. 
Personal interviews have been performed in collaboration with the DHL Network 
and Security Manager for Hubs and Gateways in UK and Ireland and a 
specialist professor from Loughborough University. The purpose of the first 
interview was to understand the air network organisation within Europe and the 
strategy behind the choices made by DHL in recent years. The second interview 
was more targeted on qualitative and quantitative data collection.   
 
A total of four phone interviews have been realised. The persons called were 
from DHL for two of them, Liege airport, TNT and FedEx. The purpose of phone 
interviews was similar to personal ones, obtaining quantitative & qualitative data 
plus explanation on the strategy and network organisation.  
 
The main gap in the interview process was the non presence of UPS contact, 
leading to a lack of clear explanations and details. The data obtained from this 
collection process were mainly qualitative. Some quantitative data was acquired 
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with collaboration of relevant persons, particularly from subcontractors 92and 
airport authorities93. 
 Secondary data 
In addition to interviews, secondary data was used, mainly from annual reports, 
investors’ face book, European statistics databases, and integrators’ annual 
reports. 
5.6 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed and briefly presented the selection and execution 
of three methods to address the research objectives. These map, GDP and 
weighted distance comparisons will provide foundations to establish results and 
conclusion on the integrators’ network strategies in the intra-European market.  
 
The chapter has first determined the research approach based on two points. 
Then several methods considered have been presented before the selected 
ones. Finally a brief description of the data collection process is provided to the 
reader. 
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6 Integrators’ Networks  
6.1 Chapter Overview 
The aim of chapter 6 is to present and comment on the results obtained from 
the analysis in order to realise the objectives of this project. The discussion is 
organised in three parts. The first part is focused on the central hub location 
analysis, in order to determine the key factors influencing integrators’ decisions. 
The case of the hub selection is presented first on a worldwide scale before 
focusing on the European market. The second part will present the results of 
the map analysis to determine the network configuration. Integrators’ Hub and 
Spoke network configurations are first revealed and analysed before describing 
the international connection with these networks and those design strategies. 
Finally, the final part will show the temporal organisation of integrators’ 
networks. 
6.2 Hub Location 
One of the most important values in network architecture is the key role played 
by central air hubs, particularly with the use of combined air and ground 
transport (DPWN, 2006). The first section refers to continental hubs location 
selected by integrators, and then the second section examines the European 
situation.  
6.2.1 Continental hub 
Continental hubs play a major role for integrators’ worldwide network. Three out 
of the four main express operators have chosen investing in three places to 
support their global network: Europe, US and Asia. Regarding the following 
maps, similarities are visible between central hubs locations. DHL has opted for 
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three geographic places, Brussels 94 in Europe, Hong Kong 95 in Asia and 
Wilmington 96in the US as shown in the figure below.  
Figure 40: Map of the former DHL intercontinental network97 
 
FedEx also operates three central hubs in Memphis98, Paris 99and Subic Bay 100 
as can be seen in the figure below.  
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Figure 41: Map of FedEx intercontinental network101 
 
The three regional hubs used by UPS are Louisville (USA), in America, 
Cologne-Bonn in Europe and Taipei (Taiwan) for Asia, illustrated in the figure 
below.
Figure 42: Map of UPS intercontinental network102 
 
 
In the case of TNT, the Dutch group has officially only one continental air hub in 
the world at Liege. This situation is the result of a strategy based on domestic 
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and intra-regional road networks connected with commercial flights capacity. 
Under these circumstances TNT needs less in-house airport infrastructures. 
Regarding the case of Shanghai, Van Der Berg 103  (2007) certifies that the 
Chinese airport is not perceived as a hub despite direct connection to Liege. 
Hong Kong and Singapore also do not carry out the function of central hub, 
despite concentrating most of the shipments directed to Asian markets carried 
in block space of commercial flights.  
 
This description has underlined similarities in continental hubs’ locations. 
Indeed, in North America, three central hubs are basically located in the eastern 
part of the US. In Asia and Europe, the situation is comparable.  In the first 
continent, the likely place chosen to operate a major hub seems to be the South 
West Asiatic area, such as locations like Hong Kong, Subic Bay and Taipei. 
Similarities in continental hubs locations show the presence of strong common 
factors influencing integrators in their geographic selections. This point is further 
developed through the case of Europe in the next section. 
6.2.2 The European Continental Hubs 
Regarding the past decision made by integrators to set up a continental hub, a 
particular area seems suitable. This specific zone, illustrated in figure 43 has 
been defined by Doganis and associates (1999): “On all these grounds, the 
ideal location for an express continental hub lies in the Aachen-Maastricht-Liege 
region on the borders of Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Germany”.  
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Figure 43: Ideal location for a European continental Hub104 
 
This statement is confirmed by Del Marmol 105  who believes that the main 
advantage of Liege airport is its geographic position. Del Marmol gives a first 
factor by announcing that 65% of European industry is located within the 
geographic triangle between Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Paris, displayed in 
figure 31.  
Figure 44: TNT main hub location106 
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 Moreover, three of the four integrators have located their main European hub in 
this region i.e. UPS at Cologne 107Airport, TNT at Liege Airport, DHL108  at 
Brussels. This trend reinforces the idea that hub location is influenced by 
proximity of the market and industrial density. This factor corresponds to a 
commercial sense where suppliers look for geographical proximity with their 
potential customers. However the fourth operator, FedEx, has selected Paris 
Charles De Gaulle airport for its central European hub. This choice is due to 
several factors, such as a different operating strategy and the chance to access 
the large Parisian market.  Vogels 109 explains that Paris is an excellent position 
regarding the main European markets, France, Germany, United Kingdom, but 
also Italy and Spain. Paris is at the middle of these markets. However, 
compared to the competitor hubs, Paris location is less appropriate to connect 
eastern and central Europe markets. Based on the previous discussions the first 
and main factors influencing hub selection seems to be the proximity to the 
market and industrial concentration where the airport is located. However, the 
author believes other factors could influence the selection. The case of DHL 
central hub move from Brussels to Leipzig provides further explanations.  
 The DHL decision to transfer the European Hub location 
DHL decided, in 2004, and is processing to change the location of its European 
super air hub from Brussels airport in Belgium to Leipzig Halle airport in 
Germany. One of the main reactions following this decision was a surprise as 
the German airport does not benefit from an international reputation. “Leipzig 
Halle airport was not well known in the industry until after the DHL move…” (Air 
Cargo News, 02/2007).  
However, a change of hub is excessively costly and must be justified by 
different reasons. Indeed, the airport contains a series of serious advantages 
compared to the previous hub. The airport operates 24 hours thanks to a 
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location far from the city centre. The airport, not well known, provides 
possibilities of extension with unexploited land surfaces and infrastructures 
already established. The cost of air operation in the new airport is cheaper than 
traditional hubs. Finally the airport enjoys a more central location within Europe 
than traditional hubs, closer to the growing eastern European market and 
allowing the development of its road network, cheaper than air links. The 
following argument is subject to discussions within the express industry.  
Despite the fact that Eastern Europe is now more dynamic 110than the western 
part, as illustrated by figure 32 comparing GDP growth between the former 
fifteen European countries and eastern countries, the market size remains 
largely different.  
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Figure 45: Comparison GDP variation between 1997 and 2008 for Western and Eastern 
Europe  111(index 100 = 1995) 
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Considering the statement made by Doganis & Associates regarding the 
position of competitors’ continental air hubs, a comparison of GPD, at current 
price, has been done on the period 1997-2008 (see figure 33). The value for 
2007 and 2008 are forecasted and data have been extracted from Eurostat. The 
comparison deals with the countries located around the triangle area 
Maastricht-Aachen-Liege and Eastern European countries. Despite a slight 
reduction, disparities between the two groups are momentous. The first group 
produced a consolidated GDP more than eight times greater than Eastern 
countries.  
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Chapter 6 – Integrators’ Networks 
 
91 
Figure 46: Comparison of GDP produced between 1997 and 2008112 in Millions of Euro (at 
1995 prices and exchange rates) 
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In order to go further in the analysis, a weighted distance calculation has been 
done for each integrator’s central hubs, taking into account DHL’s decision 
problem. So, an average distance weighted by GDP has been realised in order 
to consider two sensitive values in central hub location; distance and market 
dynamism. The first figure assesses the central hub location in comparison to 
its home network. Looking at figure 8, the reader can remark an excellent 
position of Paris for FedEx network and a decrease in DHL central location 
performance. It means that the average distance between Leipzig and DHL’s 
core markets is greater than with the previous central hub location.   Moreover, 
Doganis and Del Marmol113 statements seem to be confirmed as Liege 114and 
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Cologne 115 are relatively close to their markets with an average weighted 
distance approaching 780 km (figure 34). The case of FedEx’s location needs to 
be taken carefully regarding FedEx’s network which is mainly focused on the 
European economic centre called the “blue banana” including industrial areas 
from the Netherlands to northern parts of Italy.   
Figure 47: Weighted Distance to serve their own network 
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In order to compare hubs’ location on the same basis, the second figure 
presents the results of a weighted distance calculation for locations serving the 
top European markets. The second figure confirms the statement deduced with 
the first calculation presented above.  First of all, Del Marmol’s and Doganis’ 
statements are confirmed. Liege 116 and Cologne 117 are the best locations 
considering only the latter analysis. Indeed, both cities have an average 
weighted distance around 570 km.  Secondly, the second calculation confirms 
the impact of the network size on the first calculation (figure 35). Finally, the 
disadvantage of the new DHL location is confirmed. The Leipzig average 
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weighted distance increased by more than 22% compared to Brussels. 
However, the results have to be taken with caution regarding the future 
prospect of the European economy. Indeed, a significant development is 
planned to happen in the eastern European area. Industry in this area is 
developing rapidly and will create further opportunities for the express industry.  
 
Figure 48: Weighted Distance to serve the top European destinations 
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Regardless of this concern, DHL’s decision will have a massive impact for the 
new airport. Leipzig airport will be the third freighter airport in Germany and the 
third biggest DHL hub following Hong Kong and Wilmington in USA. However, 
the new network organisation required to integrate the future central hub is 
another concern for DHL but several explanations have been communicated by 
DHL’s manager at Leipzig airport to clarify the situation. According to the 
manager, Brussels operations are going to continue as a sub-hub and Cologne 
ones as a gateway (Air Cargo News 02/2007). The chronology of the move is 
following. In February 2007, DHL located 12 aircraft and Lufthansa had moved 
6 MD-11 from the Cologne-Bonn hub due to joint venture agreements. The 
German carrier agreed to swift operation for DHL from Cologne-Bonn airport to 
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Leipzig in order to maintain this collaboration: “Lufthansa cargo is getting 20% 
of its revenue from DHL and wants to expand relationship and to participate in 
their growth” (Air Cargo News 02/2007). In October 2007, DHL will locate 17 
aircraft and in April 2008, DHL’s operation will account for 33 aircraft. In 2006, 
30,000 tons were handled by the airport, 100,000 will be handled in 2007 and 
the quantity planned to be handled in 2008 is around 450,000 tons such 80% 
provided by DHL (Air Cargo News 02/2007). In 2008, intercontinental 
connections will be added and in the future the airport will have a cargo railway 
station. The new hub will allow improving service quality and capacity to some 
eastern emerging countries but would not create a massive opening of new 
routes. The network is flexible and adaptable to a new demand on particular 
routes. There will be some changes such as the Cologne connections or 
regarding domestic air routes in Germany which will be switch to truck links 
(Interview with J. Becasse on DHL’s route network, 3rd July 2007).  
Manley118 asserts that at DHL, the decision process to select a hub, a sub-hub 
or a gateway relies on a combination of several factors such as capacity, 
environmental concerns, possibility of consolidation, location, geography, 
weather conditions, and capacity to create inbound and outbound traffic. Manley 
takes the example of Metz to illustrate this statement. Metz is a former DHL hub 
during a short period, its location was excellent, the capacity suitable for 
express operations but difficulties to consolidate enough freight compromises 
DHL’s interest to operate this place. The case of Vatry is similar to Metz, 
according to Manley. The airport, in competition with Leipzig to host the new 
DHL European air hub, provides an excellent capacity 119 with two runways, 
effective surface transport connectivity but its downside is the inability to drive 
sufficient local traffic. The opposite example concerns Paris as stated by 
Manley. Paris Charles De Gaulle airport has an excellent location to drive origin 
traffic. However, operating in such airports brings several issues to deal with, 
such as slot restriction and night curfew eg in Frankfurt or Heathrow. One the 
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examples selected by Manley 120  was the situation occurring in London 
Heathrow where an aircraft landing and taxiing after 10h30 must park for the 
night.  
 
The case study about DHL central hub move has provided further discussions 
and factors to consider while selecting a hub in Europe. First of all, the main 
factor influencing integrators’ decision is the proximity to the market served and 
industrial concentration. The weighted distance analysis provides the proof of 
Liege and Cologne airports attractiveness through their proximity to integrators’ 
markets. The case of FedEx, based in Paris, shows the same desire for the 
American integrator to be closer to its core market located in the “blue banana”. 
Moreover several others factors has been announced by DHL. Indeed, the 
capacity of the runway, through slots restriction, night curfew and airport 
charges are extremely sensitive factors as timing and cost efficiency are key 
factors of competitiveness in this market. The possibility of a future night ban 
and environmental concerns of the local community at Brussels airport has 
been seriously considered in DHL expansion plan. Another factor is the 
possibility to expand and built necessary facilities for logistics and consolidation 
purposes. The capacity is driving traffic is also key factor provided by the author 
to explain hub selection in Europe. The cases of Metz or Vatry prove that 
providing an excellent location and sufficient capacity is not enough to attract 
integrators. Indeed, the possibility of driving local inbound and outbound traffic 
is also a major concern for integrators. The latter factor reinforces the reasons 
why FedEx selected CDG airport, despite slot restrictions and high operational 
cost. Finally, network strategies selected by integrators needs to be considered 
while analysing hub selection. The last factor, influence of the network structure, 
will be discussed through integrators network description and analysis in the 
following sections. 
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6.3 Intra-European Networks geographic structures  
The four integrators operate different network structures using different airports. 
This part will describe the structures applied by the four integrators and their 
strategy behind it. This part will first present the four networks, then describe the 
connections with the international networks and finally present the different 
features of the decision process. 
6.3.1 Network Configuration and Operations 
DHL is used to operate a dense air network within the European market, 
through three nodes levels, the Hub previously based in Brussels, the five sub-
hubs in East Midland, Copenhagen, Vitoria, Bergamo, Cologne-Bonn airports 
and several gateways, as presented in the figure below. In order to illustrate the 
density of DHL air network in Europe, the case of France is taken into 
consideration.  The French market is now 121served by eight air centres 122 
(Interview with J. Becasse on DHL’s route network, 3rd July 2007).  
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Figure 49: DHL European Air Network in 2004123 
 
In the case of FedEx, describe by Vogels124, the main European hub is located 
in Paris, as show in the figure below. In figure 36, the FedEx network 
configuration displays the characteristics of a single hub and spoke structure 
with several cases of by-pass traffic. Indeed, in term of quantity, the Paris hub 
absorbs 95% of intra European connections and 60% to 70% of international 
connection with Europe.  Quantity of freight going through Paris every day 
reaches 70,000-80,000 packages. The network is also composed of 
intermediary nodes in Cologne, Malpenza and Madrid. Vogels relates the case 
of Malpenza. Paris is connected with Malpenza twice daily using A300 and then 
from the Italian airport, feeder flights are operated to final destination. Moreover, 
Cologne is a possibility to create a future sub-hub, due to its strategic central 
position in order to support a future eastern expansion if the demand increases 
in this market.  
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 The figure below presents another characteristic of the FedEx network. Indeed, 
the structure is less dense than its competitors, and this can be explained by a 
lower presence of the North American group in the intra-European market 
compared to its rivals. This case demonstrates a relationship between the 
market presence and commercial orientation with network configuration. 
Figure 50: FedEx European Air Network in 2004125 
 
 
TNT on another hand operates a dense network as indicated in figure 51. 
According to Van Der Berg126 (2007), one of the strengths of TNT resides in 
having the least expensive network in Europe compared to others integrators. 
The figure below confirms that TNT operates a hub and spoke air network 
where Liege airport is essential. Van der Berg confirms the role of the Belgium 
airport: 
“Anything that goes in Europe goes by Liege”   
In fact, despite few direct air links done domestically, or within an area i.e. 
between Spain and Italy, in Scandinavia or within the British Isles, Van Der Berg 
(2007) estimates that 90 to 98% of intra European traffic and 70% of all TNT 
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Express international overnight express consignments go through the hub. 
Liege is connected daily to 69 European cities127and around 12 intercontinental 
destinations (TNT, 2007).128  Moreover, in figure 51 appears that TNT uses 
several intermediaries and stop-overs to concentrate operations such as in 
Madrid, Copenhagen, and Bergamo.  
Figure 51: TNT European Air Network in 2004 
 
 
The high concentration of TNT air network at LGG airport can be explained by 2 
characteristics of TNT strategy. First of all, TNT Express relies heavily in road 
transport within the European market. Consequently, the air network does not 
absorb the same volume as its European main competitor, DHL. Secondly, one 
of the strategic target of TNT is economy of scale.  Indeed, TNT tries to “push 
volume through its network” (ABN AMRO, 2006), which could explain the 
concentration of its air network through its hub. 
Regarding now the case of UPS, described in figure 52, the reader can remark 
a clear single hub network configuration. Indeed, UPS concentrates air routes at 
its Cologne Bonn hub, despite the use of intermediaries such as Copenhagen 
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airport as shown in the map below. From its main hub, the European network 
serves 69 intra-European and 10 intercontinental destinations (UPS, 2007).  
Figure 52: UPS European Air Network in 2004129 
 
The comparison between UPS and FedEx European’s networks can raise an 
interesting observation. Indeed, UPS which benefits a better presence in the 
European market, as discussed in the previous chapter, operates a denser 
network. This comparison demonstrates a relation between the size of 
integrator’s business and the density of its network.  
 
Compared to its competitor, the DHL geographic organisation is different. 
Draycott 130affirms DHL network configuration does not respect a pure single 
hub and spoke design due to numerous disparities such as the presence of 
sub-hubs or direct to direct routes between sub-hubs. The features of this 
network are closely similar to the one of a multi hub network. Indeed, regular 
connections are made between the hub and sub-hubs and both structures are 
part of the shipment journey, for instance Becasse 131 uses the case of a 
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shipment coming from Wilmington to be delivered in Rome. The shipment will 
pass through the Brussels hub and Bergamo sub-hub before being routed to 
Rome Ciampino. Furthermore, in several cases sub hubs are by-passed or 
numerous air centres are not directly connected with the hub or sub-hub 
(Interview with J. Becasse on DHL’s route network, 3rd July 2007) i.e. the case 
of Bordeaux, connected to Brussels through Nantes:” There are regular 
connection between Brussels and Nantes and then between Nantes and 
Bordeaux with Boeing 757”. Considering these arguments and figure 49, it can 
be concluded that DHL operates a multi hub configuration network, with 
Brussels remaining the main node. In order to illustrate this statement, a deeper 
look has been done on DHL scheduled of a sub-hub, Copenhagen airport, 
obtained thanks to Mr. Lars Korup.  The DHL temporal organisation at the 
airport, presented later in this paper, allows dividing destinations in two groups, 
the spokes (orange) and the hubs (in yellow). The figure shows the 
characteristics of a regional hub connecting a local area with the rest of the 
network. The yellow nodes confirm the presence of several hubs.   
Figure 53: DHL destination to/from CPH airport 
 
Indeed, this figure shows the typical network organisation of the DHL network in 
Europe. Each sub-hub serves a local area and is connected to the different hub 
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or sub-hub of the continent. The models of Copenhagen schedule are similar to 
the features of a regional hub, presented in chapter 1.  
 
The use of multi hub configurations can be understood by the fact that DHL is 
the market leader in Europe and reaches a sufficient level of traffic to support 
this structure. Comparing DHL’s European network with DHL’s North American 
network shows a tremendous difference. In US, the German company operates 
a single hub network. Moreover, the multi-hub configuration provides also an 
explanation of new DHL central hub location at Leipzig airport. Indeed, the 
presence of several intermediary hubs sufficiently close to their local markets 
provides more flexibility at DHL to select its new location. The location of the 
hub is less sensitive to the proximity of the demand. 
6.3.2 International connection with the European Network 
Contrary to its competitors, Heathrow is part of DHL’s intra-European network. 
However, the British gateway only plays a role in the worldwide network. 
Indeed, the British airport is used for its tremendous belly hold capacity on 
intercontinental flights. Regarding the fact that DHL does not operate its own 
fleet for intercontinental flights, DHL operations at Heathrow airport are 
comprehensible. In complement to the airport, East Midland and Cologne Bonn 
are used to serve as intercontinental gateways, respectively for North American 
and Asiatic links. Cologne Bonn performs this function since the agreement 
between Lufthansa and DHL to share capacity on Lufthansa freighter flights to 
Asia. FedEx also uses this type of node in its network. London Stansted (main), 
Frankfurt, Manchester 132  and Cologne are FedEx gateways for international 
connexion to North America (Vogels133, 2007). Moreover, FedEx is more flexible 
for its intercontinental network than for its intra-European one. Indeed, 
possibilities to have direct connections between the markets are high. This 
                                            
 
132
 Manchester FedEx air centres will start during spring 2008 
133
 Interview of A. Vogels on FedEx air route network in August 2007 
Chapter 6 – Integrators’ Networks 
 
103 
statement means that intercontinental flights do not necessary connect 
continental hubs.  
Looking at TNT, the Dutch company uses Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Paris, and 
London airports to perform international connections from and to Europe (Van 
der berg134, 2007). The use of major European airports to expedite shipments is 
attributable to the fact that, similarly to DHL, TNT relies on commercial belly 
hold capacity for intercontinental flights. In complement to these connexions, 
the Dutch company set up early this year a new route, served four times weekly 
from Liege to Shanghai using its recently acquired 747-400ER fleet,. This airlink 
is the result of a strategic decision to connect the future two larger TNT 
markets. 
6.3.3 Network development strategy 
Manley135 asserts, when designing the intra-European air network, that DHL 
follows traffic demand. For instance, the examination of new routes from 
Bratislava demonstrates that in the case there is not enough traffic the aircraft is 
routed to another city to fill it. It is a matter of trade and balance. In the case of 
unbalanced traffic, DHL tries to split the aircraft uses with another operator like 
it has been the case with TNT in the past. In the case of an increase in demand, 
DHL considers the option of upgrading the aircraft size, but this solution is very 
expensive so the intermediary step can be the share of capacity. Manley136 
summarised DHL’s strategic approach when considering a new service: 
“If it induces minor change, and implies good product opportunity, we do it”. 
At DHL, the decision process to expand some part of the network or reduce 
others one depends on two main features. First, sufficient demand needs to be 
established. In some case, a route can be operated for only one customer. 
Manley take the example of Finland. In the past, there were route dedicated to 
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serve Nokia factories. Secondly, the decision can result in a particular situation 
in a country. In the case of a poor road network affecting the quality of service in 
an area, i.e. the case in Ukraine or Slovakia, DHL uses small aircraft to connect 
the spokes. It is a trade off between quality of product and operating cost 
(Interview with A. Manley in July 2007). 
At FedEx, the decision process to expand the network is done centrally. 
Vogels137 explains that every time a business case is done. FedEx concerns are 
local operations, marketing, strategic, and competitive position. When the 
decision is taken, FedEx first operates subcontracted operators in the case of a 
poor presence in the area. Then, in order to improve products and if it is 
economically viable, proper FedEx planes are operated.  
 
6.4 Intra-European Air Networks temporal organisation  
Following the four integrators’ spatial organisation analysis, temporal 
organisations are now considered in order to understand some operating 
differences. 
 
The figure below presents DHL’s temporal organisation for its air intra-European 
hub. First of all, shipments are routed to the local air centre (spoke) until 22:00. 
Following consolidation stage, shipments depart to the hub or sub-hub between 
22:00 and 24:00 local time to arrive at destination between 23:00 and 02:00 
(next day) local time. Arrived at the hub, shipments are consolidate in the 
sorting centre. Next to the consolidation stage, shipments leave to the spokes in 
order to reach air centres between 06:00 and 08:00.   
                                            
 
137
 Interview of A. Vogels on FedEx air route network in August 2007 
Chapter 6 – Integrators’ Networks 
 
105 
Figure 54: DHL temporal organisation for intra-European network138 
 
 
 
 
 
FedEx has a different operating pattern, with the main sort at the Paris hub 
occurring between 1800 and 1930 rather than between 0200 and 0300 as 
described in the figure below.  
Figure 55: FedEx temporal organisation for intra-European network139 
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The main reason for that difference is the result of a strategy more focused on 
Europe’s international market than intra-European one. Consequently, the 
carrier takes advantage of the differing time zones to optimise transatlantic 
deliveries as shipments from Europe arrive at Memphis just after midnight local 
time and are distributed throughout the USA by 0900 am (Doganis and 
Associates, 1999). One of the disadvantages of this system is collection time 
earlier than its competitor on another hand the delivery is performed earlier than 
rivals as explained by Doganis & Associates (1999).” FedEx had to compromise 
on the latest time that goods can be collected from the reception or the factory 
gate if they are to fly via the Paris hub to European destinations”. Moreover, 
DHL founds another option. Indeed, when the whole journey could be 
completed by truck, which is the case for much of North West Europe, the 
company could perform later collections (Doganis and Associates, 1999). In 
order to complete the road network, FedEx also operates early morning slots 
but is restricted at Paris Airport. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 4 allows drawing several statements analysed during the analytical 
process. Knowing that integrators follows different strategy market and operates 
at different levels of presence in the European market, the autor supposes that 
integrators strategy and business size the European market influence their 
network configuration and so their hub location.  
In order to develop this supposition this chapter discusses the outcome of the 
author analysis, organised in three points: the central hub location, the Intra-
European Networks geographic structures and their temporal organisation.  
 
Three out of four integrators operate 3 continental hubs to support a worldwide 
network. The exception, TNT, has decided to develop intra-regional ground 
network completed with air links and to connect directly these networks using 
commercial flights. Consequently, TNT does not need continental hubs out of 
Europe, where the intra-regional air network is dense. Another point from this 
analysis is that integrators tend to select similar strategic areas, close to market 
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to position their continental hubs. In the case of Europe, the strategic area is 
located between Paris, Frankfurt, and Amsterdam. However, the recent DHL 
move to Leipzig does not follow this rule. The first conclusion that can be drawn 
from the first part is the influence of several common factors while selecting a 
continental hub. The main driver is the proximity of the demand. Indeed, the 
reason of the attractiveness of such geographic area, described above, is the 
proximity to the main European business centres. The weighted distance 
calculation demonstrates that the two best hub locations selected by integrators 
are Cologne and Liege. Moreover interviews with professional reveals other 
significant factors in the selection process i.e. airport capacity, possibility of 
night operations, operational cost and the airport capability to drive traffic. In 
addition, the author conclude through the case of DHL that network 
configuration can influence the degree sensitivity to market proximity in the 
decision process. 
 
The four integrators have adopted different network configurations and different 
strategies. However, two network configurations emerge. The first one, the 
single hub and spoke configuration with stop-over and intermediaries’ nodes, is 
adopted by FedEx, TNT and UPS. The second one, adopted by DHL, is a multi-
hub network configuration with a main hub and five regional hubs serving a 
particular geographic area. The difference between DHL network and its 
competitors is due to a combination of factors. First of all, DHL benefits a strong 
market position in Europe and absorb sufficient quantity of freight to justify such 
heavy structures. Secondly, DHL is likely to use more intensively air transport 
than TNT which found its strategy on ground network. Then thirdly, this network 
is more flexible to serve new destinations. The comparison of temporal 
organisation between FedEx and DHL revealed differences due to different 
focus in term of market served. FedEx uses the differing time zones to optimise 
transatlantic deliveries from Europe to the US in order to be more competitive 
on this market segment. 
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Moreover, the hub location switch to Leipzig will not at short and medium term 
perspective change this configuration as the sub hub will remains present in the 
network except for the case of Cologne that will become a gateway. 
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7 Conclusion & Recommendations 
7.1 Chapter Background 
This paper provides an analysis of the main integrators’ networks on the 
European network as well as a comparison of the four integrators’ strategies. 
The analysis was structured in three points, defined as the objectives. This 
chapter will, first, draw conclusions in accordance with the three objectives, and 
then will present the recommendations for further studies.  
Prior the analysis, several possible factors have been revealed. The main one is 
the relation between market size and strategy with network configurations in 
Europe. Indeed, it has been recognise that on one side DHL, in situation of 
market leader, and UPS which has invested heavily in Europe in the past and 
should operate a more developed air network than TNT, relying heavily in road 
transportation and FedEx did not focus until recently to the intra-european 
market. 
7.1.1  Determine the key factors influencing Integrators in European 
Hub selection 
The methodology used to find key drivers for central hub selection was based 
on comparison between the different integrators hub location supported by the 
case study of DHL move to Leipzig. The case study used weighted average 
distance calculation, between the central hub and core markets. The first finding 
of this analysis is the presence of a strategic geographical area in Europe. 
Indeed, Doganis and Del Marmol’s states that the best place to locate a central 
hub in Europe was within an area between Cologne-Paris-Amsterdam. The 
position of both Cologne and Liege hub operated respectively by UPS and TNT 
has revealed their proximity to the current core markets. Moreover, Leipzig is 
revealed more distant to DHL markets than Brussels. However, this analysis 
needs to be balanced by the future opportunities given Eastern European 
countries and the sensitive issue of night operation curfew.  The second finding 
is the presence of common drivers in the integrators hub location. Indeed, the 
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first and mail factor found is the role of market proximity while selecting a hub. 
Moreover interviews of professionals revealed others significant factors in the 
process as follow. Airport capacity140, environmental restrictions141, operational 
cost and capacity of driving traffic are also key factors influencing airport 
selection for central hub.   
7.1.2  Identify hub and spoke network configurations selected by 
integrators 
Two trends emerged out from the route map analysis in the European market. 
First of all, the hub and spoke model is still the reference for integrator network 
designs. Secondly, two hub and spoke configurations are used by integrators, 
the single hub and spoke network with pickup stopovers and feeders is applied 
by FedEx, TNT and UPS. The three integrators founded their networks on a 
single hub, Paris for FedEx, Liege for TNT and Cologne for UPS. The second 
configuration is the multi-hub and spoke model with a central and several 
regional hubs serving a specific geographic area. DHL central hub is based at 
Brussels but will be switch to Leipzig. The DHL regional hubs are Bergamo, 
East Midland, Copenhagen, Vitoria and Cologne.  
7.1.3  Identify strategies behind such configurations 
Network configuration relies on the integrators’ strategies. Several factors 
influence networks designs, specifically two of them: the size of the business 
and the transportation strategy. Several cases analysed in the paper support 
this conclusion, especially DHL’s network in Europe. DHL is the market leader 
in both intra-European and Europe-international markets. Consequently this 
company carries a significant amount of traffic. This situation coupled with a 
long air transportation tradition explains partially the reason for a multi-hub 
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network configuration in Europe.  Indeed, when looking at DHL’s network in the 
US, where the company has only the third position, the reader can observe a 
single hub and spoke network. The case of FedEx’s network is similar, except 
the opposite market situation.  
 
The second factor that was found is proven by the TNT situation. The 
company’s activities in the European market are relatively large with a second 
position in the intra-European market. However, the company’s air network is 
applying a single hub and spoke configuration due to a limited use of air 
transport for more intensive road transportation. 
 
“FedEx is a network of networks …” 142 
 
7.2 Recommendations 
This paper provides a specific approach to analyse integrators’ network 
performances through a central hub location. Two directions can be 
investigated in further research. 
 
First of all, due to a lack of route data, the measure of concentration planned to 
be used in order to assess the degree of dependency on the central hub was 
not carried out. A model could be developed in order to determine the factors 
influencing route selection in the framework of the integrators’ business. 
 
Secondly, looking at John Gardiner’s paper on airport choice for non-integrated 
carriers and the latter research, further research could be carried out on 
integrators hub selection using survey and data modelling.   
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